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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines a Coast Guard-led networked community (Citizen's Action 
Network — CAN) by exploring the network's potential to augment the Coast Guard in 
managing its prodigious maritime domain risks. Through an expansive literature review, 
a survey and a set of semi-structured interviews, a proposed set of community-based 
structural components were identified and tested for strength and significant relationships 
using ANOVA, Regression and Student’s T statistical testing methods. Findings suggest 
that component parts of CAN fit into a business-oriented networked management model 
called a Community of Practice (COP), with vigilance emerging as a sustainable, 
predictable and highly desirable post-9/11 networked community behavior. CAN's 
demographics were also examined to determine trends, such as above-average military 
veteran membership, which may support future targeted volunteer recruiting. Finally, 
various Coast Guard-initiated CAN communication methods were tested for significant 
impact; volunteers receiving phone calls correlated to higher levels of trust in the Coast 
Guard, while those receiving written communications maintained a heightened sense of 
access to the Coast Guard. These findings underscore the yet-untapped potential to groom 
grassroots vigilance, build trust in government and create a culture of prevention by 
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A. A SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL THREAT 
The National Strategy for Maritime Security and its derivative National Plan to 
Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness attest that there are few areas of greater strategic 
importance than the nation’s oceans and waterways. These defining documents claim that 
our nation’s waterways present a broad array of potential targets where terrorists could 
inflict mass casualties or cause significant economic harm. The National Plan to Achieve 
Maritime Domain Awareness, for instance, emphasizes this risk as its primary argument 
for improving national security processes to better prevent maritime terror activity. This 
key concept is highlighted in this passage: 
The oceans are global thoroughfares that sustain our national prosperity 
and are vital for our national security. Distinct from other domains (e.g., 
air and space), the maritime domain provides an expansive pathway 
through the global commons. Terrorist organizations recognize this, and 
also realize the importance of exploiting the maritime domain for financial 
gain and movement of equipment and personnel, as well as a medium for 
launching attacks.1 
Indeed, waterborne attacks on U.S. and European targets within the past few years 
illustrate how terrorists are capitalizing on the vast marine environment. The use of one 
or more small boats, similar to the attacks on the USS Cole in 2000 and the French tanker 
Limberg off the coast of Yemen in 2002, offer one example. Another involves the use of 
a single larger ship to come alongside a target and detonate onboard explosives. This 
strategy was used in 2004 when a fishing vessel attempted an attack on an Iraqi oil 
terminal.2  
                                                 
1  Department of Homeland Security, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the 
National Strategy for Maritime Security (Oct 2005), ii, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSPD_MDAPlan.pdf (accessed August 24, 2007).  
2  Christopher Dickey, “Al-Qaeda at Sea,” Newsweek, January 27, 2003, 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-22203138_ITM (accessed November 29, 2006), 
8. 
 2
While there remains a clear and present threat with the maritime domain, both 
internationally and domestically, the development and implementation of effective 
counterstrategies has been elusive. This issue was made clear in a December 2006 New 
York Times article, “Failure to Navigate,”3 where the reporter imputes a confused federal 
hierarchical organization that divides control of the waterways among fifteen agencies 
and paints a desperate picture of interagency conflict and high-tech failures. These 
failures reportedly allow an average of “fourteen boats smuggling drugs, guns or 
immigrants or engaged in other crimes [to] reach United States shores every week.” 
Hardly three months had passed from the publication date of this story when forty 
Cubans arrived undetected on two Florida beaches — ironically at the height of an anti-
migrant training exercise dubbed “Operation Vigilant Sentry.” The migrants actually 
made it past an anti-migrant drill that included 325 officers from eighty-five federal, state 
and local agencies. The migrants waded ashore to be identified only when a vigilant 
citizen called in what looked like an unusual situation.4   
B. “IT TAKES A NETWORK TO FIGHT A NETWORK” 
A growing body of evidence suggests that reliance on a traditional hierarchical 
structure will not generate the kind of results needed to win our current international 
conflict. One of acclaimed author John Arquilla’s most enduring theoretical claims in this 
context — that of winning the Global War on Terror (GWoT) — is “it takes a network to 
fight a network.”5 He suggests national policy and military leaders need to move in the 
networking direction from one currently rich in hierarchical structure, saying, “it’s the 
only sound basis for policy in this area.”   
                                                 
3 Eric Lipton, “Failure to Navigate  Security Effort by Coast Guard Is Falling Short,” New York Times, 
December 30, 2006, http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/sf/nyt12_30_6_2.htm (accessed August 18, 
2007). 
4 BBC World News, “Cubans Land During U.S. Coast Drill,” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6434127.stm (accessed August 18, 2007). 
5 Harry Kreisler, “John Arquilla Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International 
Studies,” UC Berkeley, March 17, 2003, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Arquilla/arquilla-
con4.html (accessed June 16, 2007). 
 3
While Arquilla supports his claims with a variety of wartime cites, independent 
sources have validated his assertions. Consider, for example, the subject of the June 2007 
Newsweek Magazine story, “Gathering the Tribes, U.S. Field Commanders are finally 
beginning to tap the traditional networks that helped Sadam stay in power.” In it, the U.S. 
military’s emerging networking efforts in Iraq have been credited in one city for reducing 
insurgent attacks from thirty to less than one a day.6  
Closer to home, The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is 
suggestive of a networked approach to help combat maritime threats in claiming that all 
members of the Global Maritime Community7 (GMC), including “public” stakeholders, 
must have an effective understanding of maritime activities, garnered through persistent 
vigilance to increase detection, deterrence and interdiction opportunities. Without such 
wide-ranging, networked and vigilant relationships in place, the plan argues, “vital 
opportunities for an early response can be lost.”8  It calls on the Coast Guard and its 
GMC partners to develop creative programs with broader and more comprehensive scope 
and vision to enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), where MDA is defined as 
“the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could 
impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.”9 The 
maritime domain itself is defined as, “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, 
adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all 
maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo and vessels and other 
conveyances.”10   
                                                 
6 Melinda Liu, “Gathering the Tribes, U.S. field commanders are finally beginning to tap the 
traditional networks that helped Sadam stay in power,”  Newsweek Magazine, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18881803/site/newsweek/ (accessed June 16, 2007). 
7  National Plan, the Global Maritime Community of Interest (GMCOI) includes, among other 
interests: federal, state, and local departments and agencies with responsibilities in the maritime domain. 
Because certain risks and interests are common to government, business and citizen alike, community 
membership also includes public, private and commercial stakeholders, as well as foreign governments and 





Other policy and strategy documents produced since 9/11, including The National 
Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, stress the importance of networking 
citizens into a larger community of agencies and individuals. The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, for instance, identifies citizens and first responders as key players in 
a concerted national effort that will win the GWOT.11 Indeed, public safety officers at all 
levels of government have garnered the assistance of volunteers to provide adequate 
numbers of human resources needed to effectively and safely manage large-scale 
response and recovery evolutions.12  
According to government statistics, there is one firefighter for every 280 citizens, 
one sworn police officer for every 385 citizens and one emergency medical 
technician/paramedic for every 325 people.13  In the maritime domain, however, this ratio 
is not as forgiving, with only one Coast Guardsman for every 7,500 Americans.  
Improvements in networking the non-affiliated or yet-to-be-formed community 
have the potential to be a highly important force multiplier as the ratio of citizen to 
professional officer is stark.  
C. HIERARCHIES ARE STRONG BUT SLOW, NETWORKS ARE SUPPLE 
AND NIMBLE 
While there have been successes in utilizing trained citizens in aiding first 
responders, there remains a notable national-level void in building networks of 
unaffiliated citizens within homeland security and prevention-centric missions — 
especially in the Maritime Domain. Arquilla suggests that while our nation might have 
                                                 
11 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: Office of 
Homeland Security, July 2002) 2, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/ (accessed July 20, 2006).  
12 Large-scale disasters, such as Hurricane Andrew that hit Homestead, FL in August 1992, the 
terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, the terrorist 
attacks on New York and Washington D.C. on September 11, 2001, Hurricane Charley that hit Charlotte 
and Hardee counties, FL on August 13, 2004, Hurricane Frances that hit Palm Beach, FL on September 4, 
2004, Hurricane Ivan that hit Pensacola, FL on September 15, 2004, and Hurricane Jeanne that hit near 
Stuart, FL on September 26, 2004 have taught response and recovery strategists the importance of 
integrating and coordinating civilian volunteers into disaster management planning. See Michael M. 
Gonzalez, “Citizen Involvement in Disaster Management” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,  
2005), 1.  
13 Department of Homeland Security, “Citizen Corps Introduction” (PowerPoint Slide 10), 
http://www.citizencorps.gov/ppt/cc_overview_060804.ppt (accessed August 26, 2006).  
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embraced some level of networking in fighting the GWOT, government leaders do not 
network well in carrying out the domestic GWOT mission. He claims that the 
Department of Homeland Security relies on a “stove-piped” hierarchy and that it must be 
changed.14  Moreover, Arquilla charges that the attacks of 9/11 came through, not just a 
failure of managerial imagination, but a failure to use networked information properly 
due to a national hierarchical-based organizational structure. “This should be a lesson to 
us, one that at the domestic level we still haven’t gotten.”15 
So, while the notions of a networked community that fosters citizen vigilance and 
creative problem solving are touted in national strategy documents, movement towards 
implementing, formalizing, exploiting or effectively studying a national-level MDA-
inspired networked community remains elusive.16 Senior Research Fellow for National 
Security and Homeland Security James Carafano agrees. He suggests that only marginal 
efforts have been made to coordinate research and development of MDA techniques and 
tactics among myriad federal agencies since 9/11. Further, he says the disparate lot of 
pilot projects, experiments and ongoing initiatives lack coordination and clear plans to 
operationalize the research results.17  
As a DHS agency, the Coast Guard is charged with protecting the nation’s 95,000 
miles of shoreline, including ports, cities and critical infrastructure. There is much 
hanging in the balance between the Coast Guard’s decision to rely on standard 
hierarchical practices or adapt to a more networked approach.  
                                                 
14 Kreisler, “Arquilla interview.”  
15 Ibid. 
16 The Coast Guard provides a passive reporting phone number and encourages all Americans to use 
it.  However, the program, “America’s Waterway Watch (AWW),” lacks the information distribution, 
collaboration and common operating picture tools and technologies demanded by the National Strategy for 
Maritime Security, the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, or the Secure Seas, Open 
Ports Strategy. Boaters and beachgoers (among others) are requested to report suspicious activity by calling 
a toll-free hotline. This campaign relies on word of mouth, brochures and a web site as its primary means 
for educating the boating and seaside publics. As a campaign, it has no methodologies for contact or 
follow-up with the citizens who fall under its programmatic umbrella; users are not members and there is 
no training.    
17 James Jay Carafano, “Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea,” The 
Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, no. 2041, June 11, 2007, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg2041.cfm (accessed June 15, 2007). 
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D. NETWORKS AND GOVERNMENT 
In the days and weeks following 9/11, our national leaders sought to form 
networks of trained citizens under a new program called Freedom Corps, with a mission 
of responding to a crisis at home, rebuilding communities and extending American 
compassion throughout the world. President George Bush discussed the need for 
volunteers servicing government needs in a 2002 State of the Union Speech: 
Time and distance from the events of September the 11th will not make us 
safer unless we act on its lessons.  America is no longer protected by vast 
oceans.  We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and 
increased vigilance at home… My call tonight is for every American to 
commit at least two years — 4,000 hours over the rest of your lifetime — 
to the service of your neighbors and your nation…America needs retired 
doctors and nurses who can be mobilized in major emergencies; 
volunteers to help police and fire departments; transportation and utility 
workers well-trained in spotting danger.18  
The call to national service within a volunteer network is not new. Calls to 
volunteer in unique, non-hierarchical government networks, however, have been around 
for only about a decade.  
Government-led networking is defined as: “…[N]etworks of public organizations 
…[involving] formal and informal structures, composed of representatives from 
governmental and nongovernmental agencies working interdependently to exchange 
information and/or jointly formulate and implement policies that are usually designed for 
action through their respective organizations.”19 In 1997, researcher Lawrence O’Toole 
explained these networks as: 
Structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts 
thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others 
in some larger hierarchical arrangement…The institutional glue 
                                                 
18 The White House, State of the Union Speech, 2002, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html (accessed August 21, 2007). 
19 Robert Agranoff, Leveraging Networks: A Guide for Public Managers Working across 
Organizations. In Collaboration: Using Networks and Partnerships, ed. John M. Kamensky and Thomas J. 
Burlin (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 63. 
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congealing networked ties may include authority bonds, exchange 
relations, and coalitions based upon common interest, all within a single 
multiunit structure. In networks, administrators cannot be expected to 
exercise decisive leverage by virtue of their formal position.20   
O’Toole claims that government’s increased responsibility, for managing multi-
faceted and multi-jurisdictional issues, presents challenges to which no single 
organization could comprehensively respond. Also, growing government complexity is 
catalyzing growth of broad, multi-dimensional, collaborative networks21 because 
problems are now more prevalent.22  
Professors William Snyder and Xavier de Souza Briggs pragmatically highlight 
the opportunities of a broad government-to-citizen approach, emphasizing a bottom-up 
networked solution to solving national challenges in their 2003 report, Communities of 
Practice: A New Tool for Government Manager: 
The local players must be treated as equal partners in a larger governance 
system that serves and engages all citizens. This is a crucial mind-set to 
establish in order to elicit the foundation of trust, reciprocity, and shared 
values that will facilitate knowledge flows and collaboration across 
agencies, sectors, and levels. Current institutional silos are embodied not 
only in the informal elements of the organizational culture, but also in the 
formal structures, systems, and procedures by which federal officials are 
typically constrained.23   
This transitional phenomenon is evidenced by the post-9/11 U.S. National 
Intelligence Community shakeups — restructuring to maximize collaboration and sharing 
                                                 
20 Lawrence J. O’Toole Jr., “Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research-Based Agendas in 
Public Administration,” Public Administration Review 57 (January/February 1997): 45  
21 Brinton H. Milward and Keith G. Provan, “A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using 
Collaborative Networks,” IBM Center for the Business of Government, 2006, 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/main/winners/index.asp (accessed May 10, 2007). 
22 Joop Koppenjan and Hans-Erik Klijn, “Managing Uncertainties in Networks: A Network Approach 
to Problem Solving and Decision Making,” in “Leveraging Collaborative Networks in Infrequent 
Emergency Situations,” by Donald P. Moynihan, IBM Center for the Business of Government, June 2005, 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/main/winners/index.asp (accessed May 10, 2007). 
23 William M. Snyder and Xavier de Sousa Briggs, “Communities of Practice: A New Tool for 
Government Managers, IBM Center for the Business of Government,” November 2003, 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/main/publications/grant_reports/details/index.asp?GID=159 
(accessed May 10, 2007), 51. 
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among many diverse partners.24 Another example includes the networked goal of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA),25 which promotes 
the establishment of a broad and informed environment that will link people, systems, 
databases and information from all levels of government. Finally, the networked 
approach is forwarded in the National Strategy for Homeland Security’s reliance on 
“…principles of shared responsibility and partnership with the Congress, state and local 
governments, the private sector and the American people.”26 (emphasis added) 
Despite the upward trend in network utilization, some argue that government 
leaders should move more quickly into this nascent arena, repeatedly citing the daunting 
needs and mission-driven objectives of the twenty-first century.27  
Enhanced access to knowledge through new technologies has increased public 
uncertainty to a point that government agencies, more than ever, need to rely on networks 
of skilled and resourceful actors.28 Snyder suggests that our government institutions need 
to be creative in developing these tools as they provide the cornerstones for mitigating 
national-level threats (through international relations and providing for the national 
defense), enacting supporting legislation and their affiliated protocols and methods.29 
 
                                                 
24 Snyder and de Sousa Briggs, “Communities of Practice.” See also COP Theory by Etienne Wenger 
at http://www.ewenger.com/theory/. 
25 U.S. Congress, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: The Interim 
Implementation Plan Report in Support of the Information Sharing Environment (Washington DC: United 
States Government Printing Office, 2004) Congressional Reports: H.Rpt. 108-796 –
,http://www.ise.gov/Q&A%20ImplementationPlan2-3-06.pdf (accessed November 27, 2006).  
26 The National Strategy for Maritime Security. Washington D.C: Office of Homeland Security, 
September 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html (accessed August 14, 
2006), 2. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Donald P. Moynihan, “Leveraging Collaborative Networks in Infrequent Emergency Situations,” 
IBM Center for the Business of Government, June 2005, 
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/main/winners/index.asp (accessed May 10, 2007). 
29 William M. Snyder and Etienne Wenger, “Communities of Practice in Government, The Case for 
Sponsorship,” an executive unpublished memo, Dec 2003.  Provided by the author, May 11, 2007. 
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E. COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE 
A continued threat in the post-9/11 environment has created pressure for all levels 
of government to introduce niche products and service innovations to maintain a safe and 
secure public environment. In response, some government organizations charged with 
homeland security missions are attempting to leverage shared knowledge creation within 
social network-driven communities, or networked communities, referred to as 
communities of practice (CoP).30 
A community of practice (CoP) is a group of individuals who come together to 
learn by sharing knowledge and experiences related to their activities.  Participants at all 
levels can benefit from their community relationship; questions can be answered, new 
insights are provided and broad support can be offered. Originally, the term was used to 
include communities that met or communicated about a specified business or community-
oriented topic.31 “Typically, the term is now associated with professional, work-oriented 
groups that may be associated with a professional organization, a company or 
government agencies.”32  
Popular definitions of CoP concepts refer to the process of collective social 
learning that occurs when people have a common interest in “some subject or problem, 
collaborate over an extended period to share ideas, find solutions or build innovations.”33  
More sophisticated explanations showcase these communities as core elements of 
society that steward knowledge assets, thus becoming a “social learning system” where 
                                                 
30 Snyder and de Sousa Briggs, “Communities of Practice.” See also Department of Defense, 
Communities of Interest, http://www.defenselink.mil/cio-nii/coi/index.shtml (accessed May 10, 2007). 
31 Jennifer Preece, (2004) Etiquette and trust drive online communities of practice. Journal of 
Universal Computer Science (draft / accepted, in press), 
http://www.ifsm.umbc.edu/~preece/Papers/Tacit_Know_COPs.pdf (accessed August 26, 2007). 
32 Ibid., 1. 
33 Wikipedia, Community of Practice, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_of_practice (accessed 
May 13, 2007). 
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networked participants or practitioners collaborate to develop standards and  
relationships, problem solve and share ideas.34  
In line with this thesis, CoP theory holds that an essential dimension of a CoP is a 
reliance on voluntary community participation. The voluntary aspect acts as the catalyst 
for members to best learn and relate to their roles in ways that ultimately add value to the 
whole network of participants.  
In line with the spirit of this thesis, government agencies are said to have the 
opportunity to capitalize on a CoP in times like ours as “communities of practice often 
form in response to some catalytic event that increases attention to a strategic civic issue 
and gets the attention of sponsors.”35   
F. TOOLS TO FIGHT A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR 
Ample evidence suggests that, in the weeks and months after 9/11, most 
Americans were greatly and forever affected by that day’s violence. The loss of nearly 
three thousand U.S. civilian lives and the very real possibility of more terrorist attacks 
(such as Anthrax in 2001) initiated an era of extended and heightened domestic anxieties. 
Frank G. Hoffman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute suggests the new American 
normalcy must include a mindset of preparation and flexibility: 
In the new normalcy we already face an implacable, cunning enemy who 
is completely ruthless, constantly learning and altering his tactics to secure 
any advantage he can. We have to be prepared to face this adaptive 
enemy, and be equally prepared to out-think and out-adapt an elusive 
opponent. There are no simple solutions or templates against such 
adversaries. Rigid approaches and non-adaptive institutions fare poorly 
against this protean form of enemy.36 
A question resonating on the minds of many, in the post-9/11 era, is whether 
America will ever get back to normal.  Simply searching the phrase, “A new American 
                                                 
34 Snyder and de Souza Briggs, “Communities of Practice.” 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Frank G. Hoffman, “The New Normalcy, Foreign Policy Research Institute,” 
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20060512.americawar.hoffman.newnormalcy.html (accessed June 24, 2007). 
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normalcy” in an academic search engine turns up nearly 19,000 hits.37 The days of the 
U.S. military carrying the fight to hotspots outside of our nation’s borders are over. The 
battlefront, and the fear and tensions that go along with a battlefront, is now the 
homeland — our cities, communities and waterways.  
Today’s enemy uses technology, wide-ranging and diverse social contacts and 
web resources to form nimble and capable networks that can act as highly effective force 
multipliers. Researchers warn that we have a long way to go in adapting ourselves to a 
networked approach that can counter the networked threat. Academics say government 
agencies must give up our Cold War-era hierarchies, and the networking pump is primed 
as citizens are looking for leadership.  
That said, this thesis proposes that the Coast Guard adopt a nationwide citizen-
based network approach to assist in managing many of its near-shore all-hazards missions 
through the use of a CoP that stresses  engagement, education and, most importantly, 
vigilance as common denominators across a broad spectrum of waterfront homeowners, 
businesses, tribal leaders and boat owners.  
The transition to a CoP will not be easy — the Coast Guard has relied on 
celebrated and capable hierarchies for more than two hundred years of service. Its post-
9/11 transition to DHS from the Department of Transportation, however, has increased its 
oversight of maritime security-related missions and duties. This transition has included 
heavy investments in high-tech solutions to managing a sophisticated, ever-changing and 
challenging mission set.  
Some of these high-visibility investments have yielded poor or questionable 
outcomes that have left holes in the nation’s maritime defenses. This issue surfaced in the 
aforementioned article, “Failure to Navigate.”38: The Coast Guard installed long-range 
surveillance cameras, coastal radar and devices that automatically identify approaching 
vessels to help search out possible threats. But the radar confuses waves with boats. The 
                                                 
37 “A new American normalcy,” typed into Google Scholar on June 24, 2007, returned 18,800 
research options. 
38 Lipton, “Failure to Navigate.” 
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cameras cover just a sliver of the harbor and coasts. And only a small fraction of vessels 
can be identified automatically….Work is far behind schedule and over budget.  
The article quotes a federal official acknowledging the limited progress made 
toward creating a viable defense at harbors, nationwide, against a maritime attack, despite 
the billions invested in port security since 2001. The Coast Guard’s spokesperson 
reflected this sentiment… 
The more vigilant and alert you are, the less likely the adversary will 
decide this is a good way to strike at you. For now, there are lots of 
cockpit doors that have not been reinforced.   
—Capt. Dana A. Goward, director of the Coast Guard project, 
Maritime Domain Awareness. 
Like most Americans, the Coast Guard is wrestling with a new normalcy in a time 
of change. That said, a maritime CoP could enhance the Coast Guard’s prevention and 
response capabilities while exponentially expanding its near-shore sensory capabilities. 
This potential is important for study in today’s dynamic, fluid and fast-paced 
environment. As a small agency with a large mission, the Coast Guard needs to work 
beyond traditional barriers to solve problems, share ideas or respond to threats with 
informed, committed and capable stakeholders.  
G. RESEARCH GOALS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this research is to contribute to the understanding of how government 
organizations might better engage in implementing homeland security innovations via 
non-formulaic innovative practices that facilitate service efficiencies and enable broad 
problem-solving capabilities that ultimately act as force multipliers at the citizen level.  
This thesis will utilize CoP components and attributes as a basis from which to 
provide theoretical support, evaluation and understanding of how a national-level CoP 
could act as a grassroots force multiplier for the Coast Guard. This relevancy of this 
approach is multifold:  
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• First, the Coast Guard has no CoP doctrine or research to implement a national-
level citizen-based CoP. Simply, there is a lack of pragmatic, homeland security-
centric networked community guidance.  
• Second, researchers suggest there is continuing confusion about how CoPs should 
be managed, despite published guidance in non DHS/CG endeavors.39  
• Third, theory suggests that mismanagement of a CoP can have significant 
consequences — especially at the governmental level where homeland security 
agencies are challenged to cope with an ever-changing threat, limited resources 
and high stakes for failure. Lawrence O’Toole notes this potential: “Conventional 
theory (traditional hierarchy management) may actually be counterproductive 
when applied inappropriately to network contexts.”40 
This study will explore and identify the theoretical attributes of a CoP. These CoP 
attributes will then be used to evaluate a unique regional41 maritime collaboration and 
corroboration “community” called Citizen’s Action Network (CAN) with an emphasis 
toward a national implementation.  
I will endeavor to identify a new CoP outcome tailored for homeland security 
purposes: Vigilance. I suggest vigilance is the lowest, but most valuable, common 
denominator for homeland security leadership to engender within citizens across all 
domains. 
Finally, I will attempt to showcase how government leadership can engage 
citizens, bolster or strengthen its CoPs, and improve vigilant capabilities and behavior.  
With this in mind, I will attempt to answer the following research questions:  
 
                                                 
39 Milward and Provan, “A Manager’s Guide to Choosing and Using Collaborative Networks.” 
40 O’Toole, “Treating Networks Seriously.” 
41 The Citizen’s Action Network only services the states of Washington, Oregon and the Canadian 
province of British Columbia.  It is not a national program. 
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1. Do the demographics of the citizen's action network, a networked 
community, indicate trends in networked community volunteerism? 
 
2. Does participation in the citizen’s action network, a networked community, 
increase levels of social capital and civic engagement? 
 
3. Do higher levels of social capital, social identity, goal clarity, access to 
parties, trust-based social capital and expertise location lead to increased 
“innovative vigilance" and increase the likelihood to report? 
  
4. What effects, if any, do coast guard-led communications have on the citizen’s 
action network? 
  
5. Do members populating the higher range of access to parties and trust-based 




Figure 1.   CAN Scatterplot 
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CAN is displayed within a common operating picture. Each icon represents a 
CAN member’s location. The graphic interface allows full access to member’s training, 
contact information and other significant information to Coast Guard dispatchers when 
the colored icon is clicked. Color is used to distinguish different levels of membership; 
red represents Canadian CAN members living on or near the US/Canadian maritime 























II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Following the attacks of 2001, and the spate of naturally occurring disasters since, 
all levels of government have hoped to engage, train and ultimately come to count on 
everyday Americans to go beyond voting and to actively participate in ameliorating the 
nation’s threats. With this in mind, consideration in defining and capitalizing on the 
concept of social networking becomes paramount. Further, as the homeland security 
mission matures, we must look towards capitalization and implementation of social 
networking as a legacy force multiplier across all domains, including the identification of 
citizen roles tailored to fit any commitment level. 
This literature review will focus on how the maritime community might harness 
this nation’s social capital and draw on citizen engagement to enhance Coast Guard 
capacities with Maritime Domain Awareness. Further, through the process of building an 
MDA-inspired relationship with citizens, the Coast Guard could ultimately develop a 
more trusting relationship, eventually empowering communities to support crime 
prevention as well as bolster prevention and response capabilities. This review will cover 
literature on the topics of social networks, social capital and civic engagement, 
communities of practice, community policing, and post-9/11 national strategies and plans 
where citizen participation is identified or desired.  This material is relevant to both the 
nature of CAN and its present and future as part of a homeland security citizen-centered 
tool.  
A. VOLUNTEERISM IN POST-9/11 AMERICA 
This literature review would not be complete if it did not address volunteerism in 
post-9/11 America.  
Academics Peter Callero, Judith Howard and Jane Piliavin suggest that 
individuals volunteer in order to satisfy certain needs or motives, and that role identity is 
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the proximal cause of sustained volunteering 42 where volunteerism is defined as a 
“service to the community given without payment through a group or organization.”43 
Researchers Susan Roth and Lindsey Cohen, as well as Caroline Aldwin, claim 
that there are high levels of chronic stress in our post-9/11 society due to real or imagined 
threats. To deal with these stressors, they suggest that citizens use coping-centered 
engagement behaviors — skills termed approach, monitoring or vigilance — that are 
aggressive in dealing with, understanding and solving issues directly. Compared to an 
opposite behavioral set — dubbed avoidance, repression or blunting — the aggressive 
behaviors are obviously deemed superior.44 Research also suggests that active 
participation in an organization will continue to the extent that the experience fulfills the 
personal motivations in the first place.45  
Social Scientists David Sallach, Nicholas Babchuk and Allen Booth suggest 
volunteers garner personal benefits and positive consequences compared to those who do 
not volunteer.46  Further, they found that volunteer group members typically carry higher 
levels of community orientation, self-esteem, political efficacy and morale. They also 
exhibit much lower levels of alienation, apathy and social withdrawal.47   
Professors Ram Cnaan and Robin Goldberg-Glen point out that volunteer 
behavior is preceded by a cognitive evaluation of the benefits derived from 
                                                 
42 Peter L. Callero, Judith A. Howard, and Jane A. Piliavin, “Helping behavior as role behavior: 
Disclosing social structure and history in the analysis of prosocial action,” Social Psychology Quarterly 50 
(1987): 247-256.  
43 J. Warburton and D. J. Terry, “Volunteer decision making by older people: A test of a revised 
theory of planned behavior,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 22 (2000): 245–257, p. 249.  
44 Susan Roth and Lindsey J. Cohen, “Approach, avoidance, and coping with stress,” American 
Psychologist, 41, 813–819, 1986. Also,  Caroline. M. Aldwin, Stress, Coping and Development: An 
integrative approach (Guilford New York) 1999, found in Bruce Bongar et al., Psychology of Terrorism, 
2007 Oxford Press, Chapter 25, 409.   
45 M. Snyder, “Basic research and practice problems: The promise of a “functional” personality and 
social psychology,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19 (1993): 251-264.   
46 David Horton Smith, Richard D. Reddy, and Burt R. Baldwin, “Types of voluntary action: A 
definitional essay,” in Voluntary Action Research, ed. David H. Smith (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1972) 
159–95.  
47 David L. Sallach, Nicholas Babchuk, and Alan Booth, “Social involvement and political activity: 
another view,” Social Science Quarterly 52 (1972):879-92.  
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volunteering.48 They caution that this evidence relied heavily on general population 
surveys and not the organizations themselves.49  
Individual benefits to volunteer behavior might be explained best by David A. 
Snow and his research partners. They attempted to link individual and social movement 
organizational interpretive orientations through the use of frames. In a frame, individual 
interests, values and beliefs would match with the social movement organizational 
activities, goals and ideology, such that, together, they were congruent and 
complementary. Frame, according to their research, denoted a “schemata of 
interpretation” that enabled individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” 
occurrences within their life space and the world at large. As frames render events or 
occurrences meaningful, they function to organize experience and guide action, whether 
individual or collective.50 
E. Gil Clary and Mark Snyder’s seminal work, The Motivations to Volunteer,51 
identified variables that build upon Snow’s framing interpretations. They identified 
motivations, dubbed the Volunteer Functions Inventory (VFI), capturing six functional 
reasons for volunteerism: 
• Values: The individual volunteers in order to express or act on important 
values like humanitarianism. 
• Understanding: The volunteer is seeking to learn more about the world or 
exercise skills that are often unused. 
• Enhancement: One can grow and develop psychologically through 
volunteer activities. 
• Career: The volunteer has the goal of gaining career-related experience 
through volunteering. 
                                                 
48 R. A. Cnaan, and R. S. Goldberg-Glen, “Measuring motivation to volunteer in human services,” 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 27 (1991): 269–284.  
49 David Knoke, “Commitment and Detachment in Voluntary Associations,” American Sociological 
Review, 46 (April 1981): 141–158, p. 141. 
50 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame 
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, 
(August 1986):464–481).  
51 Clary and Snyder, Motivations. 
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• Social: Volunteering allows an individual to strengthen his or her social 
relationships. 
• Protective: The individual uses volunteering to reduce negative feelings, 
such as guilt, or to address personal problems. 
 
As a conceptual backdrop, the VFI offers an excellent tool to ascertain why 
certain people are compelled to volunteer for any post-9/11 security organization. Worth 
consideration, then, is how national leadership developed and delivered discourse in 
support of recruiting wartime volunteers.   
According to sociologists Peter Padilla and Mary Laner, “recruitment messages 
are used to capture the attention of potential recruits and to persuade them to sign on to a 
new way of life, complete with a new set of symbols (i.e., insignia), rules, and a sense of 
identity.”52  
Research shows that military recruitment relies heavily on patriotic themes and 
language for its appeal, and this trend was especially robust in the years before America 
began its role in the Vietnam conflict. However, utilizing patriotic themes and language 
for recruiting active-duty soldiers seems to be the same approach taken by national 
leadership in the wake of 9/11. Indeed, several studies on the subject contend that the 
administration and other government leaders “often articulated distinctly pro-American 
themes in their public communications,” and that “...this national identity discourse was 
at the heart of the U.S. government’s attempt to unite the American public and to 
mobilize support for the ensuing ‘War on Terrorism.’”53   
Volunteers responding to patriotic calls for duty — in capacities short of joining a 
military service — could elect to serve in many safety- or security-oriented organizations. 
Two very popular pan-national, homeland security-centric options will be explored in the 
following pages.  
                                                 
52 Peter A. Padilla and Mary R. Laner, “Trends in Military Influences on Army Recruitment Themes: 
1954–1990,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 30, no. 1 (2002): 113–133, 114. 
53 John Hutcheson et al., “U.S. National Identity, Political Elites, and a Patriotic Press Following 
September 11,” Political Communications 21 (2004): 27-50. 
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B. POST-9/11 CITIZEN ROLES IN HOMELAND SECURITY: 
A variety of books, journals, articles and thesis projects have identified not only 
the need, but also “how to” guides on mobilizing citizens to support safety and security 
missions. This literature, however, falls into two very distinct categories. The first 
emphasizes community policing and provides theories supporting neighborhood watches 
for crime prevention and heightened police officer involvement with their “beat” 
customers. The second emphasizes citizen roles in homeland security, encouraging 
growth or re-tooling of programs and training for citizen-based first responders, where 
hands-on involvement is appropriate and needed.  Specifically, this cornerstone material 
coalesces around the national Citizen Corps program. Each of these two categories, 
however, offers dynamic examples of social capital and community involvement that 
contribute to the broader American post-9/11 volunteer landscape. While the literature on 
citizen roles in homeland security contains material on community policing and 
terrestrial-based citizen response networks, academic research on citizen roles in the 
maritime realm has not been explored. To better understand citizen roles, it is important 
to distill them down, starting with a review of appropriate national policy doctrine. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines homeland security as “a 
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks  
that do occur.”54  To carry out these goals, the administration relies on “…principles of 
shared responsibility and partnership with the Congress, state and local governments, the 
private sector and the American people.” 
The strategy provides eighteen sections explicitly detailing critical mission 
objectives to be managed by all levels of government. Conversely, the suggested 
responsibilities tendered to citizens are provided only in the closing sentences of the 
document’s eighty-seven pages. These recommendations are featured at the tail of the 
document’s appendix, September 11 and America’s Response.  The text suggests 
                                                 
54 Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy, 2. 
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Americans consider volunteering to support police, join neighborhood watch groups or 
receive Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) training, among other options.55   
Unfortunately, the National Strategy’s fleeting references to post-9/11 citizen 
engagement actually represent a high water mark for capturing the spirit and capabilities 
of the American public; opportunities for participation failed to appear within the national 
security strategies and supporting plans that followed.   
Two years after the publication of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
for instance, the president called for a comprehensive National Strategy for Maritime 
Security.56  The strategy was produced to better synchronize, integrate and implement 
existing Department of Defense and Homeland Security-level strategies.  This strategy, 
and its eight subordinate maritime-related plans,57 laid out a comprehensive approach to 
achieve maritime security through the goal of attaining a globally layered and multi-
agency approach to mitigate maritime threats. Like its National Strategy lineage, 
however, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight support plans remain 
nearly devoid of specific guidelines for citizen engagement.   
The oversight in proposing an option to enlist the public’s help came despite the 
plan’s calls for “…integrating all-source intelligence, law enforcement information, and 




                                                 
55 Department of Homeland Security, DHS Press Release – February 1, 2006 (Washington, DC: DHS, 
2006), http://www.citizencorps.gov/pdf/news/cc_4_years.pdf (accessed August 14, 2006). 
56 Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy. 
57 The National Strategy for Maritime Security was signed in 2005 as a derivative strategy stemming 
from the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 41) and the Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 13 (HSPD 13).  It was a watershed event for the Coast Guard.  The NSMS has given the Coast 
Guard a clear, dynamic and urgent charter to tackle a wide range of marine-related homeland security 
challenges among and between its DHS, DOD and international partners.  HSPD 13 includes eight plans to 
ensure maritime security via initiatives that fall under headings such as awareness, prevention, protection, 
response and recovery.   
58 Department of Homeland Security, National Plan, 16. 
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Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness59 refers to “citizen” only once to explain their 
membership as part of a Global Maritime Community.60 This gap persists despite the 
plan’s claim that  
The maritime threat environment of the 21st Century requires broader 
scope and a more comprehensive vision. We must look beyond traditional 
surveillance of ports, waterways, and oceans, and continuously adapt to 
new challenges and opportunities. We must set priorities for existing and 
developing capabilities to efficiently minimize risks while contending with 
an uncertain future.61  
While the National Strategy for Homeland Security claims shared responsibility 
and partnership with the American people, the charter seems lost in the ensuing National 
Strategy for Maritime Security and its subordinate plan. These strategies and their 
supporting plans clearly recognize an overarching goal of diversifying and sharpening a 
broad array of maritime tools for achieving domain awareness.62 They fall short at 
specifically recommending investments in citizens as formal contributors, despite the 
growing realization that professional, uniformed agents cannot carry on alone.  Author 
Zack Bingham summarizes this point succinctly when claiming that “it’s vital that all 
states realize the value and importance of one common asset: their citizens.”63 
Americans have partnered with federal, state and local governments, however, in 
supporting the HLS mission in two prodigious outlets. Citizen Corps and Community 
                                                 
59 Domain Awareness is the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime 
domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.  From the 
Department of Homeland Security, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, 1. 
60 Global Maritime Community of Interest (GMCOI) includes, among other interests, the federal, 
state, and local departments and agencies with responsibilities in the maritime domain. Because certain 
risks and interests are common to government, business, and citizen alike, community membership also 
includes public, private and commercial stakeholders, as well as foreign governments and international 
stakeholders.  From the Department of Homeland Security, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain 
Awareness, 1. 
61 National Plan, 2. 
62 The maritime domain is defined as all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or 
bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, 
infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances. From The National Strategy for Maritime 
Security. 
63 Zack Bingham, “Citizen’s Corp: Connecting the home to homeland security,” Homeland Defense 
Journal 2, no. 9 (October 2004), 17. 
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Policing programs are two citizen-based organizations that warrant review here, in that 
many concepts and best practices may be exportable into the maritime domain.  
1. Community Policing 
Community policing is one of the most popular ways in which non-uniformed 
citizens can perform to serve their country and assist their community in securing our 
homeland. 
Community policing is both a philosophy and strategy, leveraging community 
interaction and support to help control crime. Specifically, citizens who are involved with 
their police departments are looked to as trusted agents in identifying suspects or 
community problems. Police who ascribe to this philosophy have a tendency to carry out 
more community outreach, which might include having officers walk their beat instead of 
driving, in an effort to build mutually beneficial bonds of trust and reliance.64 
a. Intelligence Gathering 
Building beneficial bonds of trust and reliance between police and citizens 
goes beyond traditional neighborhood-centric benefits in today’s homeland security 
environment. Grassroots intelligence-collection capabilities are more valuable today than 
ever. This sentiment is captured in Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for 
Intelligence-Led Policing at the Local, State and Federal Levels,65 which highlights this 
relationship:  
• COP officers have immediate and unfettered access to local, 
neighborhood information as it develops. 
• Citizens are aware of, and seek out COP officers to provide them with 
new information that may be useful to criminal interdiction or long term 
problem solving. 
                                                 
64 Wikipedia, Community Policing, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Community_policing 
(accessed August 18, 2007). 
65 International Association of Chiefs of Police (AICP) and Community Oriented Policing Services, 
Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-Led Policing at the Local, State and Federal 
Levels (August 2002), 2. http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/intelsharingreport.pdf 
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• The positive nature of COP/citizen relationships promotes a continuous 
and reliable transfer of information from one to the other. 
• Terrorism and other criminal activity by its nature; cell structure is 















Figure 2.   The Police/Private Sector Information Sharing-ROI Triangle. 
Concept developed by the author, artwork by Inspector Matt Simone of Nassau County Police. 
 
Police Inspector and NPS Master’s Degree Student Christopher Cleary 
focused on citizen-based intelligence issues in his thesis Strategy for Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies to Improve Collection, Analysis and Dissemination of Terrorist 
Information.66 Through the use of extensive case studies and literature reviews he 
surmised that   
…utilizing resources beyond those traditionally used in law enforcement, 
and integrating all available resources into an information sharing 
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structure, local police departments can increase the amount of information 
that is collected…The information can then be used to produce home-
grown terrorism intelligence which will be more relevant for local policing 
needs than the “all-purpose” intelligence passed down from State and 
Federal sources. It stands to reason that an enhanced level of local 
situational awareness would prove to be a powerful antiterrorist tool. 
While it is widely agreed that the effort to empower and leverage 
communities assists in the intelligence and monitoring capabilities of police, the long-
term phenomena seems to be the development of a culture of prevention, garnering of 
efficiencies, and building trust and social capital.  
C. BUILDING A COST-EFFECTIVE CULTURE OF PREVENTION 
Homeland Defense Journal author Ed Evans suggests that police-aligned citizens 
can create the environment that is hard for terrorists to operate in. In his article, 
“Operation Bold Tiger,” Evans interviews Tennessee Homeland Security Director Jerry 
Humble, who explains that communities can greatly improve their prevention capabilities 
by utilizing citizens’ eyes and ears to increase observations of suspicious behavior and 
activities. In the spirit of eliminating crime, Humble cites the highly successful 
partnership between law enforcement and citizens in the TV show “America’s Most 
Wanted.” In this show, “[Y]ou see local police at work with citizens. We’ve been doing it 
for years. We’re just adapting our capabilities,” said Humble.67  
Humble goes on to suggest another worthy benefit: Through the use of the 
community policing model, communities struggling with limited money and manpower 
will be able to increase their capabilities, thus helping a department become more 
efficient and effective.   
D. BUILDING TRUST  
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman observed in his book, The World is 
Flat, that “Without trust, there is no open society, because there are not enough police to 
                                                 
67 Ed Evans, “Operation Bold Tiger,” Homeland Defense Journal 3, no. 1 (January 2005), 28.  
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patrol every opening in an open society”.68 Similarly, the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police suggests that community intelligence programs cannot be effective 
without trust between parties because trust greases barriers to valid and timely 
communications.69  Similarly, a lack of trust between parties causes friction, conflict and 
protective communication. On that topic, author Steven Covey says that “Low trust slows 
everything, every decision, every communication and every relationship.”70 
Trust-building is an important part of a policing cultural change that must occur in 
order to achieve results. Knowing this, the Coordinating Council for the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police set out to find ways to increase interpersonal 
communication, strengthen relationships, and help build trust between agencies and 
individuals who take part in the program. The council sought to create small, linked 
networks to develop higher levels of trust where technological solutions substituting for 
person-to-person efforts neutralize trust-building opportunities.71  
In building and tending to these smaller linked community networks, police are 
providing a means for community participation where citizens can help police help 
themselves — a true win/win. RAND researchers posit that this style of collaboration 
enhances relationships and mutual understanding between community members and 
police. Ultimately, these relationships help solve community problems.72 Social scientists 
suggest that communities who bank social capital though broad participation in 
communal improvement programs, such as community policing, actually experience very 
little crime.73  
                                                 
68 Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 394. 
69 AICP, Criminal Intelligence Sharing, 14.  
70 Stephen M. R. Covey and Rebecca R. Merrill, The Speed of Trust, The One Thing that Changes 
Everything (New York: Free Press, 2006), xxv. 
71 AICP, Criminal Intelligence Sharing, 14.  
72 Glenn, “Training the 21st Century Police Officer.” 
73 Susan Saegert, Gary Winkel, and Charles Swartz, “Social Capital and Crime in New York City’s 
Low Income Housing,” Housing Policy Debate 13, no. 1 (2002): 218. 
http://fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1301_saegert.pdf, (accessed August 11, 2007). 
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Amongst the community policing literature, one profound issue found broad 
concurrence: Partnerships between police and private citizens pay substantial dividends 
in post-9/11 America, where international and domestic terror groups have demonstrated 
a successful ability to integrate themselves into our society. The message in the literature 
is clear. The home front is much better served when citizens trust the police and are 
engaged in prevention of crime and terrorism. But if prevention measures fail or if natural 
disasters hit, a second type of volunteers — those serving with the first responders — 
would be called to service.  
1. Citizen Corps  
Citizen Corps, a component of USA Freedom Corps, has 2,250 member councils 
(serving approximately 75 percent of the U.S. population). They create opportunities for 
individuals to volunteer to help their communities prepare for and respond to 
emergencies by networking local leaders, citizen volunteers and the network of first-
responder organizations.74 
Citizen Corps has much in common with community policing. Each depends on 
the spirit of volunteerism to fill broad and sometimes complex roles uniquely suited to 
prevention and response missions. Unlike the community policing literature, Citizen 
Corps’ theoretical material is very limited. 
Training and maintaining volunteer first responders in the post-9/11 world is a 
priority for the United States. The U.S. Justice Department claims that “preparing for acts 
of mass violence has become an important priority for federal, state, and local 
officials…”75 As such, the National Strategy for Homeland Security identifies citizens 
and first responders as key players in the concerted national effort that will win the war 
on terror.76  
                                                 
74 Department of Homeland Security, Citizen Corps, http://www.citizencorps.gov/ (accessed August 
21, 2007). 
75 U.S. Department of Justice, “Responding to Terrorism Victims Oklahoma City and Beyond,” 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/pdftxt/NCJ183949.pdf (accessed August 28, 2006).  
76 Department of Homeland Security, National Strategy, 2. 
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Citizen Corps was developed through partnerships with pre-existing programs for 
the purpose of creating “well-trained, better-informed, and better-prepared citizens to 
take care of themselves and others during times of crisis — allowing first responders to 
address the most critical needs.”77 Because Citizen Corps is relatively new, there are 
relatively few sources available from which to draw findings, unlike the comprehensive 
research done on community policing.  
However, Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) 578 and 879 do 
detail core concepts that give Citizen Corps its basis. They identify steps for coordination 
in response to incidents, describe the way federal departments and agencies will prepare 
for such a response (including prevention activities during the early stages of a terrorism 
incident) and “how” HSPD-5’s goals and objectives should be implemented. These 
documents spell out the scope of Citizen Corps’ duties, but it is HSPD-8 that gives DHS 
responsibility for the organization.  
There have been shortcomings in this marco-level literature, however. Pamela 
Biladeau, for instance, laments in her master’s thesis80 that the five Citizen Corps 
programs do not have professional board or licensing standards. She cites problems 
associated with volunteers serving under parameters set by a lead agency. Under non-
standard leadership, the program stays fragmented by the different needs of each state, 
local and tribal jurisdictions. Finally, she vigorously argues that DHS is shortsighted in 
simply encouraging participation with emergency response agencies. Encouragement 
alone, she posits, will not create a structure that will allow citizens to reach the 
appropriate level of preparedness needed for emergency responses or catastrophic 
incidents. 
                                                 
77 Department of Homeland Security, Citizen Corps web site.  
78 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 Management of Domestic 
Incidents (February 2003), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html  (accessed September 10, 
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While the literature here suggests that the nascent Citizen Corps organizational 
structures and principles leaves much more opportunity for research, the spirit and 
direction of the program are both viable and necessary 
E. UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL NETWORKS FOR DEVELOPING  
MDA-INSPIRED NETWORKED COMMUNITIES 
The field of complexity theory is of key interest in the study of social networks 
and should be considered a core element encouraged by proper CoP construction or 
management.  
Random graph theory was brought into modern context in 1967 by Stanley 
Milgram, who argued that any two nodes within any sized network are separated by 
approximately six links.81 Milgram found that a vast network will collapse upon itself 
and display a degree of separation between any two nodes that is significantly smaller 
than the total number of links in the network. Milgram’s theory, therefore, supports the 
popular notion that any person is separated from any other person by no less than six 
links, or six degrees, of separation.  
In 1973, Mark Granovetter introduced a social networking concept in his article 
The Strength of Weak Ties. In it he theorized that society is made up of dense clusters of 
tightly connected nodes of individuals. Some of these “nodes” have weak links to other 
clusters of individuals, which serve as bridges between these small worlds. These weak 
links prevent any cluster from becoming isolated. Further, he argues that sociological 
theory (in 1973) did not effectively relate micro-level interactions to macro-level 
patterns. He theorized that small groups aggregate to form large-scale patterns, and that 
these feed back into small groups.82 Mark Buchanan suggests in his book, Nexus: Small 
Worlds and the Groundbreaking Science of Networks, that the aforementioned weak links 
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(accessed October 8, 2006). 
 31
between these nodes assume heightened significance because they tie a network of small 
worlds together,83  thus setting the “small world” concept apart from a random network 
— one which has an equal likelihood of connecting any node to any other node.   
In 1998, Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz84 theorized that, while maintaining 
the same degree of clustering within a network, the weak ties that span to other small 
worlds significantly shrink the diameter of the entire network, such that some nodes 
develop into network hubs. This concept has roots in the 80/20 Rule forwarded by 
economist Vilfredo Pareto, who observed that 80 percent of income in Italy was received 
by 20 percent of the Italian population in the early 1900s.85 This suggestion helps, to 
some extent, explain how CoP might develop its inherent synergies, or that roughly 80 
percent of network links are possessed by about 20 percent of the nodes.   
Physicist Alberto-Laszlo Barabasi took this social network theory further, 
proposing the term scale-free networks. A scale-free network is a specific kind of 
complex network where some nodes act as highly connected hubs, although most nodes 
are of low degree. He argued that in many networks nodes possessed unequal numbers of 
links, essentially following what is known as the Power Law where just a few hubs 
possessed most of the links in the network. Specifically, this holds true, even if the 
number of nodes increases significantly, links between any two nodes negligibly 
increases.86 Thus, the distribution of links under Power Law guidance will transform a 
random network into one which is “scale-free” — moving from a state of chaos (random) 
to one with a more orderly condition.   
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Growth of a given network becomes important here in that scale-free networks 
continuously grow and expand the number of nodes, whereas random networks stay 
constant. As Barabasi sums up network growth potential: “no matter how large and 
complex a network becomes, as long as preferential attachment and growth are present, it 




Figure 3.   Network Types. 
 
Research shows that social networks operate on many levels, from family units to 
the more complex level of nations. Social networks play critical roles in problem solving, 
operating organizations and, at the individual level, they help explain success or failures.  
Knowledge and utilization of social network organization is paramount to leaders who 
hope to leverage Arquilla-like scale-free networks where government leaders or key 
volunteers might act as critical nodes or hubs.  
F. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN 
CULTIVATING NETWORKED COMMUNITIES FOR MDA  
Social capital and civic engagement are often paired together in a chicken-and-
egg-like explanation where each builds off the other. Carmen Sirianni and Lewis 
Friedland, editors of The Civic Practices Network, define social capital as “…those 
stocks of social trust, norms and networks that people can draw upon to solve common  
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problems. Eric Lesser, an associate partner and researcher at IBM, claims that social 
capital is defined as a network of connections and relationships that are shared and exist 
within a common context.  
Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu posits that the central proposition of social capital 
theory is that networks of relationships constitute a valuable resource for the conduct of 
social affairs through members with collectively-owned capital.  
In The Death and Life of Great American Cities, Jane Jacobs provides an in-
depth, qualitative view of the central importance of social capital to the survival and 
functioning of city neighborhoods. Specifically, she cites networks that provide strong, 
crosscutting personal relationships developed over time, providing the basis for trust, 
cooperation and collective action in such communities.88  
Harvard Professor Robert Putnam, through a broad and thorough presentation of 
qualitative and quantitative methods in Making Democracies Work89 and Bowling 
Alone,90 built on Jacobs’ work. He presented groundbreaking and compelling evidence 
that social capital was in decline over the generation leading into 9/11, as measured by a 
variety of indicators, such as participation in fraternal organizations, church-groups, labor 
unions, PTAs, and mainline civic organizations.  
According to the Civic Renewal movement, networks of civic engagement, such 
as neighborhood associations, sports clubs and cooperatives, are an essential form of 
social capital, and the denser these networks are, the more likely those community 
members will cooperate for mutual benefit.”91 Networks of civic engagement, they posit, 
facilitate coordination and communication. This in turn creates channels through which 
information about the trustworthiness of other individuals and groups can be tested and 
                                                 
88 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (London: Penguin Books, 1965).  
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verified. Significantly, they suggest that healthy collaborative networks embody past 
success that evolve as cultural templates for future collaboration on other problems.  
G. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH – CAPITALIZING ON SOCIAL CAPITAL 
Sidney Verba’s 1995 study of civic volunteerism interviewed more than 15,000 
Americans about their civic and organizational lives, presenting data that is consistent in 
its findings with Putnam’s, but also presenting evidence that civic participation had 
modestly increased at the level of community and local problem-solving activities. Verba 
offered little guidance, however, on how to enhance civic participation.92  
Putnam did attempt to explain the relationships between community citizen 
engagement and government performance. He suggests that social capital has significant 
political consequences, such as the promotion of political participation and healthy 
democratic government. Notably, he argues that the challenge of restoring civic 
engagement would be eased by a war, natural disaster or other crisis where citizens tend 
to lend assistance or support others. He found that, up until 9/11, citizen participation had 
been in a long decline, but, in the wake of 9/11, more Americans are now more inclined 
to re-engage in their communities.93  
After 9/11, Putnam characterizes Americans as “…more united, readier for 
collective sacrifice and more attuned to public purpose…a window of opportunity has 
opened for a sort of civic renewal that occurs only once or twice in a century…”94 While 
his groundbreaking, longitudinal survey work cut across a diverse spectrum in describing 
social movements, he stops short of recommending advantageous avenues for 
government to capture the civic momentum created by the 9/11 “window of opportunity.”   
Professors John and Mary Kirlin cite the disturbing gap between American’s 
attitudes (trust in national government up 44 percent post-9/11) and behaviors 
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(attendance at a political meeting up 1 percent post-9/11) in building on Putnam’s 
“window of opportunity” theory.95 While their broad findings agree with Putman’s — 
that motivation, skills and network connections contribute to increased civic engagement 
— they lament that the government’s responses to 9/11 have not adequately engaged the 
public during this rare widow of opportunity.  
They insist that the government must provide the institutional context for societal 
action to include “sustained commitment to combating terrorism.”96 They forward the 
notion that increased civic engagement strengthens democracy and that it can contribute 
to the development of public judgment, which is critical to sustaining support of efforts to 
thwart terrorism. As much as the Kirlins bring a galvanizing twist to Putnam’s research, 
they both agree with his observations that “though the crisis revealed and replenished the 
wells of solidarity in American communities, those wells so far remain untapped.”97 
Collectively, these authors and sources propose that social capital and civic 
engagement are important factors in cultivating healthy communities through 
communication, trust building, community participation and problem solving. These four 
factors are of the utmost importance for government leaders to both understand and 
develop if they hope to build and maintain a useful networked community.  
H. THE ROLE OF COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE IN SHAPING 
NETWORKED COMMUNITIES FOR MDA  
Citizens who belong to an organization and work toward a common goal through 
informal associations or networks are often defined as communities of practice. 
According to Brown and Duguid,98 communities of practice is the context in which work 
takes place. They argue that “canonical” or rule-based conventional structures devised to 
follow organizational processes are not suitable for the spreading of knowledge on non-
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canonical or undefined emergent issues. Instead, the organization should see itself as a 
part of a community-of-communities, knowing that there are networked collections of 
non-canonical communities in their midst.99 
A community of practice is an intrinsic condition for the existence of knowledge, 
not least because it provides the interpretive support necessary for making sense of its 
heritage.100 Julian Orr argues that these communities communicate with each other 
through a complicated web of personal networks — smaller, frequently overlapping 
groups comprised of people who know, have worked with and trust each other.101  He 
adds: “A Community of Practice is an informal network of people engaged in a particular 
profession, occupation, or job function who actively seek to work more effectively and to 
understand their work more fully.”102  
Examples in the maritime community might include advocates for marine 
mammal safety, pollution clean-up response networks or conservation groups working to 
limit suburban sprawl along the shore. 
Dr. Etienne Wenger, the foremost expert on CoP, suggests that an organization 
can be seen to consist of numerous, often overlapping, but rarely formally recognized 
communities of practice in an informal structure that exists in parallel with more formal 
forms of organization. Further, the individuals participating must perceive they belong to 
a network within a common context, where members have a shared interest or 
understanding of issues facing the organization.103 Over time, participants may develop a 
sense of oneness or social identity with the group. 
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Wenger argues that such communities are emergent structures that attract people 
driven by the need for content and relationships that cannot be contrived and brought into 
existence through managerial dictum.104 He suggests that CoPs merge tacit and explicit 
knowledge of the collective through socialization, ultimately transcending traditional 
structures and boundaries of an organization. This can often be observed in value-added 
volunteer organizations such as “Friends of the Aquarium” or “Save the Ocean,” social or 
political movements bent on pushing legislation. 
Based on the theory of local or situated learning proposed by Lave and 
Wenger,105 communities of practice are capable of building or sharing capabilities, skills 
and will. They suggest that when experts show their faces in a community and engage 
others struggling with similar challenges, solving unique situations or issues may be less 
daunting.  For the Coast Guard, these relationships can provide a living repository for 
ideas on environmental nuances, information about vessel patterns or unusual traffic, and 
directories of local maritime experts who have wide-ranging resources or knowledge that 
maritime leaders might need. 
While the findings in CoP literature offers a convincing model for tapping broad 
talents and interest groups, it is important to note that the practices identified in the 
literature fell overwhelmingly into for-profit business or leisure practice case studies. 
While the opportunities for employing the CoP lessons learned hint at great potentials 
within government — or, more specifically, homeland security practices — the available 
literature lacks substantial evidence that these methods would reap rewards in an 
environment where motivations for process improvement or innovation are clearly 
different from the incentives resting on a business’s bottom line, or the personal rewards 
or growth offered via leisure endeavors.  
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 III. COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE STRUCTURAL 
COMPONENTS 
One of the core purposes of this thesis is to identify useful attributes of a 
homeland security-oriented virtual-networked community and match them against 
traditional Community of Practice constructs through a set of “community dimensions.” 
The dimensions, derived from related and relevant academic CoP research, as applied to 
MDA. Communities of Practice, may be understood in terms of the community itself or 
“the Who,” the Domain or “the What” and the Practice or “the How.” Using the Wenger 
et al. (1998) tri-partite framework of community, domain and practice, the following is a 
synthesis of key CoP dynamics identified in the literature. 
• Domain is the shared learning agenda — how knowledge is organized — 
and determines what the goals or objectives of the community are. This 
construct was measured using two supporting variables: Goal Clarity and 
Mutual Understanding. 
• Community is the network’s shared social fabric. It operates as a filtering 
mechanism that defines organizational connections, relationships and a 
common context and language. This construct was measured using three 
supporting variables: Social Identification, Trust (Social Capital) and 
Access to Parties. 
• Practice is a baseline of common knowledge, approaches, standards, rules, 
metrics and how knowledge is shared. This construct was measured using 
a single variable as emphasized in the national strategy literature: 
Vigilance. 
The following table aligns the CoP relationships and provides relevant social 






CoP Attribute Impact on a Networked 
Community 
Goal Clarity  
 
Larson and LaFasto (1989) stress the 
importance of a clear and elevating 
goal in the performance of an effective 
team. They define goal clarity as “a 
specific performance objective, phrased 
in such concrete language that it is 
possible to tell, unequivocally, whether 
that performance objective has been 
attained”106  
 
Increased levels of goal clarity. 
Research recommends that team 
members must have clear roles and 
accountabilities. Lack of goal 
visibility may cause team members 
to feel less accountable for results, 
making the delivery/sharing of 
information, member direction, 
feedback and communications of 
heightened importance for teams. 
Domain 
 
The domain creates 
common ground and a 
sense of common 
identity. A well-defined 
domain legitimizes the 
community by 
affirming its purpose 
and value to members 
and other stakeholders. 
The domain inspires 
members to contribute 
and participate, guides 
their learning, and gives 
meaning to their 
actions. The domain 
guides the questions 
they ask and the way 




Sharing of cognitive elements of 
knowledge among team members. 
 
 
Increased sharing of cognitive 
elements of knowledge sharing…. 
Analysis reveals that oversight 
expertise/coordination shows a 
strong relationship with team 
performance that remains 
significant over and above team 
input characteristics, presence of 
expertise and administrative 
coordination.   
Social Identification 
 
Organizational identification concerns 
the perception of “oneness” with an 
organization.107   
 
 
Higher levels of social 
identification…. The construct has 
firm roots in social identity theory; 
Tajfel defined it as the “cognition of 
membership of a group and the 
value and emotional significance 
attached to this membership”108  
Community 
 
A group of people who 
interact, learn together, 
build relationships, and 
in the process develop a 
sense of belonging and 
mutual commitment.  
Members use each other 
as sounding boards, 
build on each other’s 
ideas, and provide a 
filtering mechanism to 
deal with knowledge 
overload. Over time, 
they build a sense of 
common history and 
Trust (Social Capital) 
 
Relational view of social capital is 
embedded in trustworthiness, reliability 




Higher levels of social capital ….. 
Relational view within a network 
such as CAN suggests that social 
capital is embedded in 
trustworthiness, reliability and 
institutionalized collective 
endeavor. It has been suggested that 
this is precisely what gives social 
networks their value in monitoring 
others’ actions. 
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identity, thus becoming 
the community’s social 
fabric.  Leadership in a 





boundary spanners.  
Leadership roles must, 
however, have internal 
legitimacy in the 
community. 
Access to Parties  
 
Access to parties refers to the 
opportunities to make knowledge 
combination and exchange among team 
members.110  
 
This measure refers to the 
opportunities to make knowledge 
exchange among team members as 
well as provide knowledge 
combination (the integration of 
several codified areas of 
knowledge) services to membership. 
Practice 
 
Denotes a set of socially 
defined ways of doing 
things in a specific 
domain: a set of 
common approaches 
and shared standards 




accountability.   
Vigilance 
 
Researchers describe vigilance as being 
in a wide-aware state and open for 
several different perceptions.111 
 
This Vigilance variable was derived 
from The National Plan to Achieve 
Maritime Domain Awareness which 
attests that “there are few areas of 
greater strategic and vital 
importance” than the nation’s 
oceans and waterways. It claims that 
our nation’s waterways present “a 
broad array of potential” terrorist 
targets which could inflict mass 
casualties or cause significant 
economic harm. The plan 
emphasizes and recommends broad 
awareness and threat knowledge as 
an effective measure for prevention, 
deterrence and interdiction. The plan 
highlights the need for all members 
of a Global Maritime Community, 
which includes citizens, to have an 
effective understanding of maritime 
activities, garnered through 
persistent vigilance, to allow for 
maximum detection, deterrence and 
interdiction opportunities.  
Table 1.   CoP Relationships. 
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IV. METHOD 
A. SAMPLE SELECTION 
Information was drawn from participants in the Coast Guard’s Citizen’s Action 
Network, an MDA-style program used in Oregon, Washington, and Vancouver, B.C. The 
information was collected via a telephonic survey administered to 191 citizens who were 
enrolled in the Citizen’s Action Network. Unfortunately, responses from nine participants 
were lost due to a computer problem and, due to time constraints, the surveys were not 
administrated a second time.   Thus, the original sample of 191 represents 100 percent of 
the membership contacted who were available (answered the phone or called back during 
the two-week survey period) from a total population of 208 U.S. members.  This gave the 
study a 91.8 percent response rate but, due to the loss of data, an effective 88.4 percent 
response rate.  
B. INSTRUMENT 
The survey instrument was designed via exact or derivative questions modeled 
from key social science and psychology research, as cited previously and in line with 
suggestions forwarded in Paul Leedy and Jeanne Ormrod’s Practical Research Planning 
and Design,112 as well as L. R. Gay and P. Airasian’s Educational Research; 
Competencies for Analysis and Application.113 Although concepts, constructs and 
variables of CoP literature were emphasized in the survey, the questionnaire included 
constructs designed to capture citizen engagement, citizen affect, demographic and 
qualitative materials as well.  Most of these findings will be reviewed in the discussion 
section. 
 
                                                 
112  Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Practical Research Planning and Design, 8th ed. (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Merrill/Prentice Hall, 2004) Ch. 7. 
113 L. R. Gay and P. Airasian, Educational Research; Competencies for Analysis and Application, 7th 
ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill/Prentice Hall, 2000) 113.  
 44
C. QUESTIONNAIRE PREPARATION AND DELIVERY 
A team of three master’s level Department of Homeland Security-sponsored 
interns administered the phone surveys to the target audience spending approximately 
twenty-five to thirty-five minutes with each participating CAN member. 
A three-person team received training and practice in telephonic survey delivery 
methods in line with Paul Leedy and Jeanne Ormrod’s Practical Research Planning and 
Design suggestions.114 Each was given a script, thus ensuring consistency in the opening 
and closing of the survey.  
Approximately one week before delivering the questionnaire, letters and e-mail 
messages were sent to all prospective respondents, alerting them that the Coast Guard 
would soon be calling them for their assistance with the questionnaire, thus further 
underscoring the importance of their participation.  
Finally, survey phone deliveries were routinely monitored by the thesis author to 
ensure consistency and quality. This effort resulted in, among other QA issues, the 
dropping of a question from the Expertise Location portion of the survey because it was 
too confusing for most participants. 
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
With the help of SPSS software, a full analysis of the data was gleaned from the 
sixty-three-question survey. One and two-way analysis of variance and multiple 
regression analysis were used to evaluate the relationships among and between variable 
indices making up five CoP, one civic engagement and one civic efficacy constructs as 
applied to CAN.  
Further, the survey was constructed with multiple questions designed to measure 
CAN members’ citizen engagement and citizen affect. The construct for the survey 
questions for these measures were either derivatives of other published social science 
studies or exact copies of survey questions promulgated by Americorps, a national-level 
                                                 
114 Leedy and Ormrod, Practical Research Planning. 
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community service organization. The intent here was to provide a baseline of other 
citizen engagement or affect data from which CAN responses might be measured against; 




























CAN is comprised of U.S. and Canadian civilians, Coast Guard Auxiliary, 
business owners, non-profit organizational leaders and tribal members who live on or 
near the water and have a commanding maritime view. Members have volunteered, 
signed up, to make themselves available day or night to assist in reporting real-time 
information from members’ locations along thousands of miles of sparsely populated 
seashores, rugged rivers and complex waterways. The Coast Guard calls out directly to 
citizens to have them identify sources of marine flares, on-scene weather, establish 
lookouts or corroborate any other MDA-inspired information. The members’ locations 
are maintained in a centralized C2PC database and are viewed by Coast Guard watch 
standers as operational assets within their computer-based, common operating picture. 
The CAN program has been credited with saving lives, property and agency funds. A 
review of outcomes is available in the thesis’ annex. 
A. DEMOGRAPHICS 
Survey respondent demographics were as follows: 138 males and forty-six 
females; the mean age was sixty-five; 180 respondents were U.S. citizens; four were 
Canadian citizens living in the United States; thirty were members of the United States 
Coast Guard Auxiliary, while exactly half, ninety-two were U.S. military veterans; forty-
eight were business owners and ninety-seven were members of non-profit organizations. 
The average member had been part of the network for just over two years, with three of 
the longest-term members reporting having been in CAN for more than seven years.   
B. COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND 
COMMUNITY EFFICACY VARIABLES APPLIED TO CAN  
The following describes how the study’s CoP-inspired variables — Social 
Capital, Social Identity, Goal Clarity, Access to Parties, Expertise Location, Trust-based 
Social Capital and Vigilance, as well as two community-based variables, Civic 
Engagement and Civic Affect — were analyzed within the CAN program.  
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Many social science professionals, as a rule of thumb, require a Cronbach's 
Alpha/Reliability score of 0.70 or higher.115  Cronbach's alpha is viewed as a measure of 
how well the sum score of the selected items capture the expected score for the larger 
domain, even if that domain is heterogeneous.  
Further, I analyzed each set of variables for the univariate analysis (mean, 
variance and range) to explore each separate variable in the dataset and to identify and 
summarize the pattern of response.   
1. Goal Clarity Index  
Goal Clarity is the CoP Domain component that determines how well a 
community understands the goals and/or objectives of the community. 
The Goal Clarity measure rated a Cronbach’s Alpha/Reliability score of .795, the 
third highest among CoP index measures with a mean of 3.35. The two questions 
supporting this measure were based on CAN members understanding the Coast Guard’s 
mission, as well as members understanding the associated all-hazard threats in the 
maritime environment.  
 
 





















Table 2.   Goal Clarity Index. 
CAN members are dependent on their Coast Guard sponsors to provide clear 
information and expectations of roles for each member. Without constant 
communication, rich in explicit information and direction on mutually important issues, 
members might feel less accountable.   
The relationship of goal clarity to vigilance has theoretical precedence in virtual 
team theory. The following appeared in the Journal of Management Information Systems: 
                                                 
115 Cronbach’s Alpha, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cronbach's_alpha (accessed June 18, 
2007) 
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First, team members must have clear roles and accountabilities. Lack of 
visibility may cause virtual team members to feel less accountable for 
results, therefore explicit facilitation of teamwork takes on heightened 
importance for virtual teams. Temporal coordination mechanisms such as 
scheduling deadlines and coordinating the pace of effort are recommended 
to increase vigilance and accountability.116 
The article supports goal clarity as a predictor of vigilance, albeit in a different 
theoretical context. In terms of visibility, CAN members’ actions are highly visible to the 
Coast Guard via their hub-and-spoke distribution model. In terms of explicit facilitation, 
CAN members receive routine Coast Guard phone calls instructing them on what to be on 
the lookout for and why it is important. Additionally, by providing exclusive information 
only available to the network, the Coast Guard seems to be generating a sense of 
exclusivity and importance, thus generating attentiveness to the information. 
The following list is derived from the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain 
Awareness’ integration dataset. CAN’s leadership utilizes this list to clarify details to 
members who have been called upon to provide information supporting the goal clarity 
dynamic being reviewed here. Also, CAN’s training material highlights aspects of this 
national list to encourage clear, detail-rich information gathering and reporting: 
• Vessels – Characteristics such as flag, type, tonnage, speed, origin and 
track. 
• Crews and passengers - How many on board? 
• Maritime Areas of Interest – Focus of surveillance capabilities at 
particular geographic points such as sea lanes, bridges or oceanic regions. 
• Ports – Waterways and facilities; port terminals, piers, cranes, petrol 
facilities and other structures. 
• The Environment – Weather, currents, natural resources, fish stocks and 
marine mammals. 
• Maritime Critical Infrastructure – Transportation nodes, bridges and 
undersea fiber optic cables and pipelines. 
                                                 
116 Anne P. Massey, Mitzi M. Montoya-Weiss, and Yu-Ting Hung, “Because Time Matters: 
Temporal Coordination in Global Virtual Project Teams,” Journal of Management Information Systems 19, 
no. 4 (2003): 129–155.. 
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• Threats and Activities – Identified threats and inherently dangerous 
activities such as illegal migration, drug smuggling or thefts. 
• Friendly Forces – Operational information supporting search and rescue, 
oil spill identification or off-station aids to navigation. 
Academics argue that because CoPs are not generally mandated, the primary reason they 
exist is due to their perceived value amongst the group. Therefore, whenever possible, 
they argue that leaders must focus and connect the social network to the value they bring 
or produce in support of the larger goal or mission. 
2. Mutual Understanding Index 
The Mutual Understanding measure rated a Cronbach’s Alpha/Reliability score of 
.710, the second highest in the survey, and a mean of 2.877. The three questions that 
supported this measure were based on CAN members’ beliefs that the Coast Guard both 
understood and utilized their individual skills. This variable supports the CoP Domain 
component, which, in turn, determines the goals or objectives of the community.  
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Table 3.   Mutual Understanding. 
The high Mutual Understanding measure is supported by the fact that CAN’s two-
way participatory activities encourage government–citizen engagement fostering a 
mutual understanding of environmental, threat and tactical response capabilities. In both 
concept and function, members actively provide for their own and others’ safety or 
security from the comfort of their home or business, while the Coast Guard and its 
partner agencies reap the benefits of having an informed, supportive and service-
connected public to turn to for immediate field feedback. This type of mutually beneficial 
relationship or symbiotic understanding builds social capital and social identity with a 
networked community. 
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CoP research suggests that mutual understanding is enhanced when leaders invite 
and continuously encourage broad and different levels of organizational interests to apply 
themselves or participate in an organization’s mission. Supporters have a tendency to 
include three layers of committed members, which can be visualized using concentric 
circles.117 Researchers argue that the largest group, the outer circle within this 
interdependent relationship, is often the least connected, but still very valuable. The 
theory suggests that these members should be allowed to participate at their comfort or 
capability level. The connection between the Coast Guard and its CAN citizens 
participating from a distance parallel this aspect of CoP. Further, CoP research suggests 
that leaders employ tactics to build on the least-connected group’s insights, and design or 
introduce appealing activities such as providing private/custom chat rooms on a website. 
This approach could include both sharing of ideas as well as hands-on projects to add 
vitality to CoPs. Although CAN has an interactive website, it was not available until after 
the survey. So, while members did not participate in an interactive on-line environment, 
members engaged in real-world activities that required problem solving and 
communication skills in diverse and often exciting situations. 
While the Mutual Understanding measure garnered a mean of 2.87, the relatively 
low ranking might be reflective of a lack of broad interactive interactivity. Specifically, at 
the time of the survey, CAN relied on only one-to-one partnering (Coast Guard to citizen) 
during emergent situations where each member assumed a role in tackling the same task 
or challenge. While all members received news and information of some sort, only about 
half had ever actually been called for assistance on a case, despite all members 
volunteering to receive calls. These aspects of CAN might have impacted the survey’s 
Mutual Understanding measure.  
3. Social Identification 
The Social Identification measure rated a Cronbach’s Alpha/Reliability score of 
.800, the second highest in the survey, and a mean of 3.78. The four questions that 
supported this measure were based on CAN members’ belief that they belonged to the 
                                                 
117 Wenger, “Communities of Practice,” 139-146. 
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larger Coast Guard team, or were integrated into the Coast Guard’s all hazards missions.  
This variable supports the CoP Community component, which acts as the social fabric, 
defines relationships, and offers a common context and language within the network.   
 
 



















Table 4.   Social Identity. 
CAN components supporting high levels of Social Identification include: the fact 
that every CAN member lives on, or near enough to, a waterway or beach to have 
intimate knowledge of both the marine environment and the Coast Guard organization. 
The average CAN member has been in their community for nearly seventeen years, and 
3thirty of the CAN members are in the Coast Guard’s uniformed volunteer arm called the 
U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary.  
Further, in that the Coast Guard calls on CAN members to support its all-hazards 
missions, CAN members are exposed to a variety of maritime threat scenarios that 
involve working directly with the Coast Guard. Essentially they ARE part of the mission, 
thus building on feelings of identifying with the service. This process might also be 
grooming CAN members to identify with rather unknown aspects of the Coast Guard 
mission set, like ensuring buoys are positioned correctly after a gale, thus enlightening 
members to appreciate the Coast Guard’s diverse mission set. 
Social identity might be further strengthened when members are sent routine news 
releases or notices announcing breaking or emergent marine issues. Members are also 
called directly from Coast Guard dispatch offices to garner assistance, which directly 
supports those missions happening in member’s regions. While CAN volunteers are only 
asked to scan and report case-related information (sinking vessel, oil spill sheen, 
suspicious vessel), the one-to-one relationships adds validity to the notion of social 
identification with the Coast Guard as they participate as part of a team.  
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Additionally, new members are sent signed welcome letters and are visited by a 
local Coast Guard Auxiliary member to welcome them, provide training and pass along 
pertinent information, further adding to the notion of oneness with the Coast Guard. 
Researchers cite that CoPs often suffer from too much focus on public (all 
inclusive) events. They propose going the extra mile in establishing and strengthening 
one-on-one relationships. Strong individual relationships strengthen the CoP.  This seems 
to be true within CAN, as all of its activities, structure and survey measures support 
strong Social Identity scores.   
4. Trust/Social Capital 
The Trust/Social Capital measure rated a Cronbach’s Alpha/Reliability score of 
.182, the lowest amongst all CoP measures in the survey, but the index featured the 
highest mean among all CoP and CE measures, totaling 4.47. This low CA/Reliability 
rating was factored despite the Trust measure containing the two highest means of 
individual variables in the survey at 4.9 and 4.86 on five-point scales. These right-skewed 
“curves” suggest that this measure is indeed very strong. Its statistical presentation as a 
non-normal right-skewed curve, however, could have contributed to the Cronbach’s 
Alpha not meeting the high standard, despite the survey questions themselves coming 
directly from highly reliable social science sources, such as from Putnam’s Social Capital 
surveys.  
The questions and their associated means (based on a five-point scale) are 
presented here for review: 
• Most people in the CG are basically honest and can be trusted.   4.9076 
• I would pay attention to the opinions of others in the CAN network if they 
were made available to me.            4.3587 
• Most people in the Coast Guard are willing to help if you need it.    4.8696 
• I feel accepted as a member of the CAN team.     3.7717 
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With the high means, we can assume that CAN program membership supports the 
CoP Community component, which acts as the social fabric, defines relationships, and 
offers a common context and language.  
David Halpern, author and Senior Policy Advisor in the British Prime Minister's 
Strategy Unit, calls social capital “our networks and norms of trust and reciprocity.”118 
Robert Putnam connects trust and social capital in his book, Bowling Alone. He refers to 
the social capital as the collective value of all social networks and the inclination that 
arises from these networks to support one another. Moreover, he claims that social capital 
is a key component for maintaining a healthy democracy. Conversely, he correlates losses 
in social capital with lower levels of trust in government. Francis Fukuyama, author of 
Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, makes a core argument that 
there are high-trust and low-trust societies and cultures, and that high-trust groups and 
cultures accumulate greater social capital. This suggests that networked communities 
may also benefit from activities that generate higher levels of trust. Other research has 
emphasized social capital as a key for problem solving,119 with interpersonal trust being 





























                                                 
118 David Halpern, “A Matter of Respect,” Prospect Magazine (July 2005), http://www.prospect-
magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=6936 (accessed August 20, 2007). 
119 C. Sirianni and L. Friedland, “Civic innovation and American democracy. Civic Practices 
Network,” Civic Renewal Movement, http://www.cpn.org/crm/essays/innovation.html (accessed August 
20, 2007).  
120 Carl L. Bankston III and Min Zhou, “Social Capital as Process: The Meanings and Problems of a 
Theoretical Metaphor,” Sociological Inquiry 72, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 285–317. 
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5. Government, Trust and the Coast Guard 
A 2005 Harris Poll revealed that only 27 percent of those surveyed trust the 
government.121  But, as a government agency, the Coast Guard has generally rated very 
high in trust measures.122 This is especially true in the wake of the 2005 hurricane season 
where the Coast Guard rescued or assisted over thirty-three thousand citizens in the Gulf 
region, while FEMA, the State of Louisiana and the city government of New Orleans 
faltered. However, recent foibles with the Deepwater Program, and its massive waste and 
fraud sidebars, have recently eroded some of the Coast Guard’s public esteem.123  
Despite the trends in public opinion about the Coast Guard over the years, the 
close participatory relationships CAN members have with the agency have seemingly 
allowed the Coast Guard to maintain across-the-board high levels of trust — and the 
social/organizational benefits that go along with it — within CAN participants. 
6. Access to Parties 
The Access to Parties measure rated a Cronbach’s Alpha/Reliability score of .844, 
highest amongst all CoP survey measures, and a mean of 2.89. The four survey questions 
focused on how CAN members believed they communicated with Coast Guard leaders 
and the substantive value of the information received. This is the final of three variables 
designed around the CoP Community component. 
                                                 
121 The Harris Poll, “Fewer Americans Than Europeans Have Trust in the Media – Press, Radio and 
TV” (January 13, 2005), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=534 (accessed 
August 20, 2007). 
122 This result was found in a national, population-representative study of 2,250 American perceptions 
concerning the threat of terrorism. The item of a particular interest was the examination of the lack of 
confidence in government organizations; fewer than 5% of the country had “lost confidence” in the Coast 
Guard, the lowest rating of dissatisfaction observed. Jim Breckenridge, e-mail message to author, July 23, 
2007.  
123 Olympia J. Snowe, speaking before the Oversight Hearing on Recent Setbacks to the Coast Guard 
Deepwater Program, Wednesday, February 14, 2007, “I know you share my alarm over the troubling 
pattern of mis-management that the New York Times and the DHS Inspector General has [sic] discovered, 
and it is indisputable we must restore accountability to the Deepwater program for the sake of our critical 
Coast Guard service and our homeland security.  Because I’m deeply troubled that this mis-management is 
not only a breach of trust with the American people, but has also undermined a program that is so vitally 
important to our future.” 
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Statement&Statement_ID=228, 























Table 6.   Access to Parties. 
CoP research suggests that leaders maintain an open dialog between those on the 
inside of an organization and those on the outside. This builds on the notion that leaders 
understand that those close to any issue might not have the best solutions. They stress that 
leaders need to move away from the business center to get a better perspective; they 
should bring in players who hold a periphery or secondary commitment to the issue, goal 
or mission. 
CAN’s reliance on a hub-and-spoke style of communications as its cornerstone 
component portends well for a high level of Access to Parties measurement. Further, the 
routine information exchange that takes place between members and the Coast Guard 
suggests members will have supportive opinions of the interaction. As part of the direct 
communication measure, sixty-five CAN members reported receiving 133 calls from the 
Coast Guard. One hundred and twenty nine had received routine CAN news and 
information while seventy-three had received at least one CAN newsletter (note: some 
members opted not to receive electronic information). A full breakdown of these and 
other measures is available in the appendix. 
In the spirit of access, the Coast Guard produces at least one message a week for 
the network. This information always includes a source name, e-mail and contact phone 
number that CAN members can reach with more questions or suggestions. Further, CAN 
members routinely call in observations of potential problems that might not have been 
identified by the Coast Guard’s traditional MDA sensors. This two-way information 
exchange seemingly supports CAN members’ positive feelings about networking with the 
Coast Guard and, indirectly, among other team members. 
CAN members are alerted to maritime challenges, news and breaking information 
via the Thirteenth Coast Guard District’s Internet-based information delivery system. As 
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a specific demographic within the system (broken down by zip code, for instance) CAN 
members receive information from the Coast Guard, RCMP and other DHS, state and 
local agencies about critical maritime-related items that they might not have otherwise 
received via traditional mass-media sources.  
7. Vigilance 
This study’s Vigilance measure rated a Cronbach’s Alpha/Reliability score of 
.733, making it the fourth highest amongst CoP survey measures, while the mean was 
3.91, the second highest among all CoP index measures. The three-question vigilance 
index is the lone measure supporting the Practice component, the “what” or “what is 
done” portion of a CoP. 
  
 





















Table 7.   Vigilance. 
The vigilance-based questions making up the index highlight three parts of 
vigilance. The first survey question suggests an understanding of the domain itself: “My 
understanding of maritime threats has increased since becoming a CAN member.” The 
second survey question highlights a CAN members’ state of being: “I am more vigilant 
(on the lookout) for unusual activity on or around the water since becoming a CAN 
member.” The third question, “I’m more likely to report unusual activity on or around the 
water since becoming a CAN member,” stresses a member’s vigilance-based behavioral 
potential.   
The vigilance index was used as the study’s dependent variable as it represents 
the recommended state-of-being for post-9/11 citizens as suggested by national policy, 
planning and other governmental messages. Consider, for instance, this passage from the 
State of the Union address delivered in 2002: 
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Homeland security will make America not only stronger, but, in many 
ways, better…And as government works to better secure our homeland, 
America will continue to depend on the eyes and ears of alert citizens. A 
few days before Christmas, an airline flight attendant spotted a passenger 
lighting a match. The crew and passengers quickly subdued the man, who 
had been trained by al Qaeda and was armed with explosives. The people 
on that plane were alert and, as a result, likely saved nearly 200 lives. 124 
It is within these passages, designed for a national audience and delivered in the 
heady weeks after the 2001 attacks, the president not only suggests vigilance as a tool for 
Americans, but summarily stresses its place with homeland security, and then provides an 
example. Clearly, homeland vigilance during the GWOT is a valid measure for this 
citizen-based thesis. Vigilance is used as the dependent variable in the next section, 
which will explore vigilance prediction. 
Within CAN, vigilance is stressed via introductory training, via news and 
information that is sent directly to members and via phone calls from the Coast Guard 
requesting assistance with its myriad missions. Coast Guard training materials pay 
specific attention to situational variables, highlighting the most vulnerable maritime 
domain infrastructure and their associated threats.  The following is an example of a 
training scenario offered to CAN members, which strengthens the network’s ultimate 
goal: 
You work in a business in the immediate vicinity of a ferry terminal, and 
you ride the ferry to and from work everyday. One day you observe a 
particular person taking pictures of the shore side — unusual for people 
riding the ferry during "commute time." While at work you notice the 
same person board a ferry to a different destination, and return a few hours 
later. The next day you see the same person loitering around the terminal 
as passengers pass through security while boarding ferries — at one point 
the person joins a group lining up to board a ferry, takes some pictures, but 
leaves the group without boarding. During the day you see this person 
making two round-trip ferry rides — once wearing a large back pack, and 
once carrying an oversized brief case. Over several days you notice the 
same person engaged in varied activity, at different times, all in the 
vicinity of the ferry terminal. Could the activity be completely innocent  
 
                                                 
124 The White House, State of the Union Address, 2002.  
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and explainable? Of course. Could the person be engaged in surveillance 
in preparation for a terrorist attack?  Perhaps. Is the behavior suspicious 
enough to report? Yes.125 
While the relationship featuring the Coast Guard reaching out to members 
represents the core function of CAN, the program has a rich history of members self-
reporting to the Coast Guard — essentially reporting unique and actionable information 
that might have gone unnoticed to the agency. Several examples are included in the 
annex of this thesis.  
This study’s dependent variable was also derived, in part, from concepts 
forwarded in The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness. This plan 
attests to the importance of the maritime domain when it suggests that there are few areas 
of greater strategic and vital importance than our nation’s waterways. The plan claims 
that our nation’s maritime environment presents a broad array of terrorist targets which 
could inflict mass casualties or cause significant economic harm.  
The plan emphasizes the domain’s terror potentials as motivation for improving 
maritime prevention measures. The plan recommends broad threat knowledge and 
awareness as effective measures to improve prevention, deterrence and interdiction. The 
plan calls on all members of a Global Maritime Community, including citizens, to 
develop an effective understanding of maritime activities through persistent vigilance. 
8. Community Engagement 
This study included two measures outside of the CoP model. The first of these 
was the Community Engagement measure, which rated a Cronbach’s Alpha/Reliability 
score of .756 while the mean was 4.09, the third highest among all eight CoP and CE/CA 
index measures.  
Five community engagement questions were used to make up the index and 
designed to measure participants’ beliefs on their being part of their community: 
                                                 
125 United States Coast Guard, “What is ‘Suspicious Activity?’” America’s Waterway Watch, 
http://www.americaswaterwaywatch.org/what_is.htm (accessed July 23, 2007). 
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• Do you feel like you are a part of your local community?  
• How closely do you follow local news and affairs in your community?   
• How often would you say that you have ideas for improving things in your 
community?  
• How often do you get together with people to talk about ways to improve 
your community?  
• How often do you participate in activities to make things better in your 
community? 
The Minnesota Department of Health says that community engagement is a type 
of public participation that involves people in problem-solving or decision-making 
processes.126  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention defines it as “the process 
of working collaboratively with groups of people who are affiliated by geographic 
proximity, special interests or similar situations with respect to issues affecting their 
wellbeing.”127  
Findings show that communal participation can lead to improvements in both the 
neighborhood and community. Additionally, it fosters closer interpersonal relationships 
and stronger social fabric.128 Moreover, community participation is “a major method for 
improving the quality of the physical environment, enhancing services, preventing crime, 
and improving social conditions.”129 
 





















Table 8.   Community Engagement. 
                                                 
126 The Minnesota Department of Health, “Overview: What is Community Engagement?” Minnesota 
Department of Health, http://www.health.state.mn.us/communityeng/intro/index.html (accessed August 20, 
2007).  
127 CDC/ATSDR Committee on Community Engagement, “Principles of Community Engagement,” 
Centers for Disease Control and prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/phppo/pce/ (accessed August 21, 2007).  
128 P. Florin and A. Wandersman, “An introduction to citizen participation, voluntary organizations, 
and community development: insights for empowerment through research,” American Journal of 
Community Psychology 18, no. 1 (1990): 41-55.  
129 D. M. Chavis and A. Wandersman, “Sense of community in the urban environment: a catalyst for 
participation and community development,” American Journal of Community Psychology 18, no. 1 (1990): 
55-81. 
 61
Measuring CAN’s community engagement levels gives the Coast Guard a more 
comprehensive understanding of the network’s current state, its ability to willingly rally 
around community-based issues and help solve maritime domain challenges.  
9. Community Efficacy 
This study’s second of two non-CoP measures was the Community Efficacy 
measure, which rated a Cronbach’s Alpha/Reliability score of .735 while the mean was 
4.32, the second highest among all CoP and CE index measures.  
 
 





















Table 9.   Community Efficacy.  
The three efficacy questions, using a five-point scale, were: 
• I felt like I made a contribution to the community. 
• I felt like part of a community. 
• I felt I could make a difference in the life of at least one person. 
 
Efficacy has been defined as an individual’s perceived expectancy of obtaining 
valued outcomes through personal effort.130  Research suggests that the concept of 
collective efficacy is the sense of attachment to a community, which resides in 
combination with a willingness by residents to intervene on each other’s behalf regardless 
of any pre-existing network ties.   
It is “distinct from social networks and extends the trust and solidarity dimensions 
of social capital to include the collective capacity to translate social resources into 
                                                 
130 Bruce Fuller et al., “The Organizational Context of Individual Efficacy,” Review of Educational 
Research 52, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 7–30. 
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specific outcomes.”131 The collective efficacy concept goes beyond a narrower network’s 
focus by emphasizing a community’s broader mutual trust and solidarity among local 
residents. This concept is also dubbed social cohesion and helps set expectations for 
communal action (via informal social control) and helps explain the impact of 
neighborhood factors on residents’ wellbeing.132  
While going beyond a CoP prototype, CAN’s Community Efficacy measure could 
help explain the level or sprit of a collective “Good Samaritan” movement, which is 
exercised whenever a member is called to action (literally phoned to action by the Coast 
Guard). CAN members who are called into action when lives are at stake would 
potentially perceive themselves as adding value as part of a collective response.  I would 
expect activities such as these to add to already high feelings of communal efficacy based 
on the member’s willingness to join CAN to assist in the first place.   
 
 
                                                 
131 Robert J. Sampson, Jeffery D. Morenoff and Felton Earls, “Beyond Social Capital: Spatial 
Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for Children,” American Sociological Review 64 (1999): 633–660, In 
“Neighborhood Structural Disadvantage, Collective Efficacy, and Self-Rated Health in an Urban Setting,” 
by Christopher R. Browning and Kathleen A. Cagney, Journal of Health and Social Behavior (2002): 385.  
132 Browning and Cagney, 385. 
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VI. RESEARCH QUESTION ONE 
A. DO THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE CITIZEN'S ACTION NETWORK, A 
NETWORKED COMMUNITY, INDICATE TRENDS IN NETWORKED 
COMMUNITY VOLUNTEERISM?” 
Based on the relevant literature, one might expect that volunteers who joined 
CAN would be individuals receptive to patriotic symbols, are attuned to national issues 
and have a strong sense of purpose. These individuals would be seeking roles providing 
opportunities for personal achievement while being part of a social support network.   
The following table provides a breakdown into the type of volunteer CAN has 

















N=184 138 M 
46 F 
65 97 48  180 92 16.75 30 
Percentages 75% 
Male 
 52% 26% 97.8% 50%  16% 
Table 10.   Citizen’s Action Network Volunteer Demographics & Affiliation. 
CAN membership demographics point to some notable trends:  
There is predominate male representation at 75 percent of the CAN population.  
The census bureau also tells us that that the average age in the United States is 
just over thirty-six years;133 CAN’s average is sixty-five years.  Further, American 
                                                 
133 U.S. Census Bureau, “2005 American Community Survey Data Profile Highlights,” U.S. Census 
Bureau, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_submenuId=factsheet_0&_sse=on (accessed 
July 3, 2007).  
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citizens have a tendency to move, on average, every five years; CAN members average 
nearly seventeen years in their communities.134 
The Small Business Administration advertises about 8 percent of American’s own 
businesses or firms135 while CAN membership has 26 percent in this category.  
The United States population, as of 2000, is made up of just over 12 percent 
veterans,136 while CAN boasts that 50 percent are veterans — a four-to-one difference!  
Research question number three asked if we could predict the type of volunteer 
we might see represented in a security-oriented volunteer organization. CAN’s high 
number of elderly members who are also business owners is certainly noteworthy. But, as 
CAN operates with high levels of Goal Clarity, Social Identification and Access to a U.S. 
military organization, the high numbers of U.S. military veterans is worth a deeper look.   
1. Veterans and Patriotism 
Do veterans have a propensity to volunteer in a security-oriented network? 
According to research, veterans are more likely than non-veterans to feel positively about 
the military, believe that a strong military and strong defense is essential, support 
spending on defense and are more comfortable in having their own sons volunteer for 
military service. Other findings posit that veterans are significantly more likely than non-
veterans to value national security.137 Additionally, veterans of the World War II-era 
were significantly more likely than non-veterans to value order and approve of the 
government forbidding demonstrations.138   
                                                 
134 Andy Lewis, “Mobility – A Culture on the Move,” Center for Community and Economic 
Development,  
http://www.uwex.edu/ces/CCED/economies/communityindicators/CommunityIndicators2.cfm#_ftn1 
(accessed August 26, 2007). 
135 U.S. Census Bureau, “2002 Survey of Business Owners,” (July 26, 2005), U.S. Census Bureau, 
www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2005/sbo2002_presentation.ppt, (accessed July 3, 2007).  
136 U.S. Census Bureau, “People: Veterans,” U.S. Census Bureau 
http://factfinder.census.gov/jsp/saff/SAFFInfo.jsp?_pageId=tp12_veterans (accessed July 3, 2007).  
137 E. M. Schreiber, “Enduring Effects of Military Service? Opinion Differences between U.S. 
Veterans and Non-veterans,” Social Forces 57, no 3. (March 1979): 830.  
138 Samuel A. Kirkpatrick and James L. Regens, “Military Experience and Foreign Policy Belief 
Systems,” Journals of Political and Military Sociology, 6 (Spring 1978): 29-47. 
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The topics of veterans having an interest in keeping order, promoting national 
security and protecting their community have a significant place within military 
sociology. Indeed, even the definition of military institutions suggests this: they are “an 
organized system of activity directed at the achievement of certain goals…for carrying on 
aggression against other societies, protecting the society against aggression by others, and 
providing the means for maintaining domestic order and control.”139  
Further, the term patriotism has been defined in social science literature as 
readiness to act in the service of one’s country.140 Thus, when the president called upon 
patriotic citizens to volunteer to help the nation, it seemed natural that veterans 
specifically and, in the case of CAN, overwhelmingly filled that void. Social scientists 
support this trend when they suggest that people seek and occupy jobs that fit their 
personality.141  
It is interesting to note that patriotism has been found to play a critical role in 
affecting the quality and composition of America’s all-volunteer military force.142  
Studies here have noted that the most well-educated and high achievers among those 
enlisting were more likely to choose “wanting to help my country” as the most important 
reason influencing their enlistment decision. 143 Notable here then is 22 percent more 
veteran CAN responders articulated themes of national security, as when were asked why 
they joined the network over their civilian counterparts (members with no prior military 
service). Additionally, 18 percent more veteran CAN responders articulated themes of 
community protection on the same question over their civilian counterparts. 
Political scientist Craig Rimmerman suggests that volunteerism is part of a new, 
broader definition of citizenship that “goes well beyond the traditional model of political 
                                                 
139 C. H. Coats and R. J. Pelligrin, Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and 
Military Life (University Park, MD: Social Science Press, 1965) 10. 
140 James Burk, “Patriotism and the All-Volunteer Force,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 
12 (Fall 1984): 229-241.  
141 Melvin L. Kohn and Carmi Schooler, “Job Conditions and Personality: A Personality 
Assessment,” American Journal of Sociology 87 (May 1982): 1257-1286. 
142 “Patriotism and the All-Volunteer Force,” 229-241.  
143 D. Edwin Lebby and Associates, Military Option Evaluation Study (Chilton, PA: Research 
Services, 1980) 204. 
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participation.” Instead of relying on single dimensions of measuring citizenship behavior, 
such a voting, he associated citizenship with broader forms of participation, such as 
grassroots mobilization and community participation.144 In this light, it might be 
suggested that CAN offers such an outlet that goes well beyond the “traditional” model of 
political participation in a post-9/11 landscape by offering multi-dimensional outlets for 
many diverse populations. The next section will examine some of these dynamic 
relationships. 
 
                                                 
144 C. A. Rimmerman, “The new citizenship: Unconventional politics, activism, and service,” 
Boulder, CO: Westview, in Administration & Support (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001) 5.  
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VII. RESEARCH QUESTION TWO 
A. DOES PARTICIPATION IN THE CITIZEN’S ACTION NETWORK, A 
NETWORKED COMMUNITY, INCREASE LEVELS OF SOCIAL 
CAPITAL AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT? 
With this research question in mind, two comparative studies are presented to 
allow perspective on CAN’s community engagement, civic engagement and affect 
measures.  
In 2005, a published Journalism in Mass Communications Quarterly145study 
provided a sample of over three hundred Washington State residents’ input on seven civic 
engagement measures. To find out how CAN members would compare to this “baseline” 
measure, the same seven questions were included in the CAN survey; the results of each 































































































Table 11.    CAN vs. Baseline Civic Engagement Measures. 
 
                                                 
145 Patricia Moy et al., “Linking Dimensions of Internet Use and Civic Engagement,” Journalism in 
Mass Communications Quarterly 82, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 571–576. 
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The results show that CAN members are significantly more engaged in their 
community on five of seven measures — all measures which earned a p => .001. While 
the results are not necessarily surprising, being that CAN is an all-volunteer organization 
to begin with, the strength of the significance levels at .000 suggests that there is a very 
large gap in Civic Engagement levels between the network members and adult 
Washington State residents.  
Finally, it is important to test and see if time in CAN has any effect or causal 
relationship on bolstering the Civic Engagement measures. Essentially, does time in CAN 
make a difference on the high levels of CAN’s civic engagement.  The following table 
highlights findings where the measures are tested against time in the network where time 
is represented from zero to one year (N=81) and two or more years (N=103).  Remnants 
of Table X will be maintained within this table for comparison and clarity. 
 
  



























































































from previous  
.000 .000 .000 .498 .171 .000 .000 
Table 12.    CAN vs. Time in CAN on Community Engagement Measures. 
 
As seen in Table 12, two of seven measures hint that time in CAN is significantly 
correlated with changes in direction: Worked on a Community Project (p=.098) and 
Participated in a Demonstration or Rally (p=.038). When these two measures are 
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compared to the findings from the previous tables — those being the differences between 
CAN and a baseline adult population — we can see that only Worked on a Community 
Project (p=.000) was previously significant as detailed in the previous table. Thus, this 
second chart’s findings suggest that time in CAN might have an impact on its members’ 
motivations to “Work on a Community Project” as the only significantly above-normal 
measure affected by time in the program.  
More importantly, these findings suggest that CAN both a) attracts and b) 
maintains highly engaged volunteers over time and is not necessarily a causal agent for 
changing its members’ levels of engagement. Thus we might assume from these findings 
that CAN’s mission and affiliations attract and maintain a certain kind of volunteer.  
Now that we know CAN is not a causal network per se, we can take these 
findings one more step. Here, we will test CAN’s Community and Community Efficacy 
measures against survey results found in Americorps,146 another all-volunteer service-
oriented community, to see if CAN members rank higher or lower in other community 
engagement measures in a volunteer-to-volunteer (apples-to-apples) comparison. 
First, national Americorps longitudinal survey data was garnered through the 
organization’s contracted research team. In all, data from 1,921 Americorps respondents 
were compared to CAN’s 184 across fourteen variables designed to measure efficacy 
across four dimensions: Neighborhood Obligations, Civic Obligations, Effectiveness of 
Community Service and Local Efficacy. Of the fourteen variables, only two measures 
came up with insignificant differences, but with both means favoring CAN: Participating 
in Neighborhood Organizations and Getting the Local Government to Fix a Pothole on 
My Street. The twelve measures and their results follow: 
  
                                                 
146 “AmeriCorps is a network of local, state, and national service programs that connects more than 
70,000 Americans each year in intensive service to meet our country’s critical needs in education, public 
safety, health, and the environment. AmeriCorps members serve with more than 2,000 nonprofits, public 
agencies, and faith-based and community organizations. Since 1994, more than 400,000 men and women 
have provided needed assistance to millions of Americans across the nation through their AmeriCorps 




CAN vs. Americorps Findings 
Neighborhood Obligations Dimension 
Americorps N=1921 CAN N=184 Means Amer/CAN Std. Dev Sig. Higher Means 
Reporting a crime you may 
have witnessed. 
2.900/2.978 .302/.146 .001 CAN 
Participating in neighborhood 
organizations. 
2.646/2.652 .514/.531 N/A CAN 
Helping keep the 
neighborhood safe. 
2.909/2.967 .294/.178 .008 CAN 
Helping keep neighborhood 
clean and beautiful. 
2.784/2.869 .425/.383 .009 CAN 
Helping those who are less 
fortunate. 
2.914/2.804 .284/.397 .000 Americorps 
Civic Obligations 
Americorps N=1919 CAN N=184 Means Amer/CAN Std. Dev Sig. Higher Means 
Serving on a jury if called. 2.584/2.869 .539/.368 .000 CAN 
Voting in elections. 2.756/2.967 .477/.206 .000 CAN 
Keeping informed about 
news and public issues. 
2.778/2.902 .432/.363 .000 CAN 
Personal Effectiveness of Community Service 
Americorps N=1173 CAN N=184 Means Amer/CAN Std. Dev Sig. Higher Means 
I felt like I made a 
contribution to the 
community. 
4.415/4.1902 .597/.970 .000 Americorps 
I felt like part of a 
community. 
4.201/4.402 .720/.869 .001 CAN 
I felt I could make a 
difference in the life of at 
least one person. 
 
4.519/4.385 .627/.945 .013 Americorps 
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Local Civic Efficacy 
Americorps N=1915 CAN N=184 Means Amer/CAN Std. Dev Sig. Higher Means 
Getting the local government 
to fix a pothole on my street. 
2.370/2.423 .592/.799 NA CAN 
Getting the local government 
to build an addition to the 
community center. 
2.046/1.788 .564/.655 .000 Americorps 
Getting an issue on the ballot 
for a state -wide election. 
2.148/1.842 .625/.844 .000 Americorps 
Table 13.    CAN vs. Americorps Findings. 
Of the fourteen variables, only two measures came up with insignificant 
differences, leaving 12 with significant differences. Although CAN members ranked 
significantly higher in seven of the twelve variables, it is important to note that the 
dimension supporting Civic Obligations fell completely to the CAN program. This 
suggests, overwhelmingly, that CAN members feel a civic duty to serve and, by joining 
CAN, have demonstrated their commitment to maintain a high level of engagement.  
Researches suggest that individuals volunteer to satisfy certain needs or motives, 
and that role identity is the proximal cause of sustained volunteering. This academic 
claim seems well-supported within these findings. That said, it comes as no surprise that 
CAN ranked as significantly higher in their helping to keep their neighborhood safe (p = 
.008) and, even more significantly, their propensity to report a crime they might have 
witnessed (p = .001), above and beyond the propensity of doing the same of another 
civically-engaged, service-oriented volunteer member.  
These findings demonstrate that, even among service-oriented volunteer groups, 
those individuals with certain needs, capabilities or desires to fill a certain role will find a 





1. Other Indicators 
I believe it is important to examine the data to see if there are any other significant 
correlations with the study’s Community/Civic Engagement and Civic Efficacy measures 
as established using survey questions developed and published by Robert Putnam and 
other social scientists. Notably, findings in this area suggest that civic participation 
increases at the level of community and local problem-solving activities. With this in 
mind, it becomes important to look into CAN and see if there are significant 
relationships. 
2. Independent Samples T Test 
Where appropriate, survey responses were divided into two groups, based on high 
(above the mean) and low (below the mean) or present/not present sets in order to test the 
significance of the difference between two groups across the study’s 
Engagement/Efficacy indices.  
To test the significance of those differences, the Independent Samples t Test was 
used. When split, all tested groups were independent and no respondent resided in both 
groups. The t Test, or Student's T, is a robust test of the significance between two groups. 
The results below show the significant differences in means using the Student’s t Test. 
Further, a review of the bifurcated variable means allows for prediction of the 
higher/lower section of the indices, suggesting directional relationships. 
• The differences between CAN’s Vets vs. Non Vets were tested and found to be 
significantly correlated with Community Engagement earning a p value of .034 
and .034 respectively when equal variances are assumed and when they are not 
assumed. The means were compared, and Non Vets were found to represent the 
high end of Community Engagement. 
• The differences between CAN’s Business Owners vs. Non-owners were tested 
and found to be significantly correlated Community Efficacy earning a p value of 
.017 and .044 respectively when equal variances are assumed and when they are 
not assumed. The means were compared, and Non owners were found to represent 
the high end of Community Efficacy. 
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• The differences between CAN’s Men vs. Women members were tested and found 
to be significantly correlated with Community Engagement earning a p value of 
.004 and .001 respectively when equal variances are assumed and when they are 
not assumed. The means were compared, and Women were found to represent the 
high end of Community Engagement. 
• The differences between CAN’s Non-profit members and those not affiliated with 
a Non-profit were tested and found to be significantly correlated with both 
Community Engagement and Community Efficacy earning p values of .000 and 
.000 respectively on both measures when equal variances are assumed and when 
they are not assumed. The means were compared, and non profit affiliated 
members were found to represent the high end of both Community Engagement 
and Community Efficacy. 
The findings presented above suggest that the CAN network indeed attracts and 
maintains diverse audiences with varied strengths and interests. This is an important 
finding in that Coast Guard CAN leaders, or any other manager of a similar volunteer 
group, need to keep these findings in mind when recruiting, providing training or 
communicating with networks of individuals, because CoP literature suggests that these 
types of communities will thrive only when leaders generate a working atmosphere that is 
equally diverse, lively and innovative.  
Further, psychology research suggests that, to maintain volunteer groups, the 
organization must provide outlets supporting individual interests, values and beliefs that 
match with the social movement’s organizational activities, goals and ideology, such that, 
together, they are congruent and complementary.  
With the Coast Guard’s all-hazard mission set, offering CAN participants an 
ability to participate in a wide variety of problem-solving activities (from oil spill and 
marine mammal protection activities to law enforcement lookout to homeland security 
mission support), the network remains interesting and fulfilling to its diverse populations. 
While CAN maintains a membership with diverse interests and skills, these sets 
hold insignificance levels when applied to a “time in CAN” measure, which tells us CAN 




not necessarily a causal factor in building higher levels of community engagement, for 
instance, but instead offers an outlet for such engaged citizens to participate  




VIII. RESEARCH QUESTION THREE 
A. DO HIGHER LEVELS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL, SOCIAL IDENTITY, 
GOAL CLARITY, ACCESS TO PARTIES AND EXPERTISE LOCATION 
LEAD TO INCREASED “INNOVATIVE VIGILANCE” AND INCREASE 
THE LIKELIHOOD TO REPORT?  
1.  Research Approach 
Regression analysis was used to evaluate the relationships between five 
independent variables (Trusts, etc…) and vigilance in a new dependent variable within 
the context of HLS. Due to the recent emergence of vigilance as a dependent variable in 
Homeland Security research, theoretical support for the proposed relations has not been 
established.  
By testing the five relationships below, this thesis seeks to provide support for the 
idea that CoP constructs (Trust, Social Identity, etc.) are predictors of vigilance and to 
propose a predictive model for community outcomes. (i.e., H1 — Higher levels of Access 




















2. Regression Analysis 
The Regression analysis was used to examine the strength of the relationships 
between the dependent variable Vigilance and the five independent variables  
 
• GOAL CLARITY  
CAN’s Goal Clarity measure predicts .567 percent of the dependent variable — 
the largest predictor value of the set. Further, its ranking gives the finding face validity as 
Goal Clarity was earlier defined as “a specific performance objective, phrased in such 
concrete language that it is possible to tell, unequivocally, whether that performance 
objective has been attained.” As such, the Coast Guard’s clear goal of who or what to 
look for in the maritime domain becomes that performance objective — clearly 
articulated in CAN training material and on a case-by-case basis via one-to-one phone 
calls or alerts.   
Further, the Goal Clarity measure fits within the larger Domain component, which 
is credited for creating the network’s common ground and giving it a sense of identity. 
CoP theorists suggest that a well-defined domain legitimizes the community by affirming 
its purpose and value to members and other stakeholders. The domain inspires members 
to contribute and participate, guides their learning, and gives meaning to their actions. 
The domain guides the questions that are asked and the way knowledge is organized. 
Clearly, the CAN program provides a very strong concept of Domain. 
 






Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
.754(a) .569 .567 .68149 .569 238.926 1 181 .000






• SOCIAL IDENTITY 
The Social Identity variable ranked second with an R-squared value of .31 or 31 
percent, which, again, seems relevant in that each CAN member, by living on a 
waterway, is probably highly familiar with the Coast Guard already.  
When waterfront homeowners join CAN, they are taking a definitive step in 
affiliating themselves as part of a safety- and security-oriented agency, and would 
certainly be expected to take on vigilance as part of that affiliation. Social Identity with 
CoP is defined as a group of people who interact, learn together, build relationships and, 
in the process, develop a sense belonging and mutual commitment.  Members use each 
other as sounding boards and, over time, they build a sense of common history and 
identity that becomes the social fabric.  Thus, it seems reasonable to say that CAN is 
indeed building its own sense of identity within the Coast Guard and amongst the wide 
variety of members who make up CAN. 
 






Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
    
.560(a) .313 .310 .86592 .313 83.027 1 182 .000
Table 15.   Social Identity. 
 
• ACCESS TO PARTIES AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING 
Access and Mutual Understanding measures follow Social Identity in order of 
impact with each generating R-squared values of .28 and .177 respectively, and 
representing both the Domain and Community components. While the values of these 
measures are fairly robust, they are generally low compared to the first two measures. 
These values seemingly reflect CAN’s limited Coast Guard-to-member communication 
opportunities outside of emergent situations. Essentially, at the time of the survey, the 
Coast Guard was only communicating directly with CAN members during emergent 
situations with only about 40 percent of the CAN population receiving phone calls. 
 78
 
Table 16.   Access to Parties. 
 






Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
.426(a) .182 .177 .94384 .182 39.550 1 178 .000
Table 17.   Mutual Understanding. 
 
• TRUST 
Finally, the Trust-based Social Capital measure rated the lowest at predicting 
vigilance via an R-squared value of .123.  This relatively low predictive value suggests 
that trust-based social capital might not have much predictive value with vigilance but 
might be more associated with trust amongst the community of CAN itself — enhancing 
the network’s social capital. Robert Putnam says that trust-based social capital is an 
institutionalized collective endeavor. At the time of this survey, CAN members had no 
way of knowing other members of the network — essentially the network members 
remained invisible to each other, with the exception of the occasional call from the Coast 
Guard and the routine receipt of news and information. It is notable to review here that, 
despite the low correlation between vigilance and trust, the individual trust question 
means were the highest in the survey, reflecting an extremely high level of trust with the 
Coast Guard.  
 






Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
.358(a) .128 .123 .97579 .128 26.707 1 182 .000
Table 18.   Trust. 






Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change
.533(a) .284 .280 .88426 .284 72.145 1 182 .000
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IX. RESEARCH QUESTION FOUR 
A. WHAT EFFECTS, IF ANY, DO COAST GUARD-LED 
COMMUNICATIONS HAVE ON THE NETWORK? 
This chapter explores the effects of CAN communications as a potential change 
maker among the network’s membership. The relationships between CAN were tested 
using receipts of the Coast Guard’s primary communication’s methods, CG e-mails, CG 
CAN newsletters and one-to-one phone calls. These communication treatment inputs 
measures were binary — they either occurred or they did not. Some CAN members had 
never received a phone call for direct assistance, while others elected not to receive e-
mails, etc. With this in mind, each group (treated or not treated) was tested against the 
eight indexes used in this study (six CoP measures and two Community – Engagement 
and Affect) providing twenty-one separate (3x7) tests for correlation.  
Of the twenty-one tests, only two of the eight indexes, Trust-based Social Capital 
and Access to Parties, demonstrated a significant relationship with any one of the three 
communication input measures. Differences in Trust-based Social Capital significantly 
correlated to receipt or non-receipt of phone calls, while Differences in Access to Parties 
correlated to receipt or non-receipt of both e-mails and newsletters.  In both indexes, 
CAN members who received communications represented the population with the higher 
means. 
1. Written Communications 
The differences between receipt or non-receipt of written communications 
(newsletters and CAN e-mail) from the Coast Guard and levels of CAN members’ 
Access to Parties were tested and found to be significantly correlated, earning a p value 
of .037 and .043 for CG Emails (67.5 percent of CAN membership had received e-mails) 
and .038 and .037 for CAN News (38.2 percent of CAN had received a CAN newsletter) 
respectively when equal variances are assumed and when they are not assumed. The 
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means were compared, and those receiving both e-mails and news were found  
to represent the high end of Access to Parties. 
2. Person-To-Person Communications 
The differences between person-to-person communication from the Coast Guard 
(vs. none received) and levels of CAN members’ Trust-based Social Capital were tested 
and found to be significantly correlated, earning a p value of .017 and .019 respectively 
when equal variances are assumed and when they are not assumed. The means were 
compared, and those with high communication were found to represent the high end of 
Trust-based Social Capital. Survey results showed that 35 percent of members received 
one-to-one calls from the Coast Guard. 
Each of these relationships can now be added to the CoP model developed and 
tested in the previous chapters. In the figure below, we can see that the Coast Guard’s 
communications can make a difference in at least two of the five CoP input measures that 
are correlated to vigilance.  The indexes representing Community Engagement and 
Citizen Affect are not shown, as the communication measures produced no significant 
relationships.  
 
Figure 5.   Influences of CAN Communications on CoP Indices.  
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The evidence presented suggests that Coast Guard-led communications do indeed 
have a positive impact on the network. While the volume of communications received vs. 
variables was inconsequential, the simple act of CAN members receiving or not receiving 
messages makes a significant difference. As an interesting qualitative side note, 
approximately 84% of CAN members surveyed suggested increased or improved 
communication from the Coast Guard when asked “In your opinion, how could we 




Figure 6.   Receipt of CAN Communications Model. 
 
With such a significant finding, I decided to push the research further. I was 
trying to “tease out” what differences in groups receiving or not receiving 
communications might have in relationship to the other indexes used in this study — 
essentially looking for a secondary relationship. This led me to produce another, 
unanticipated yet related, research question: Do members populating the higher range of 
Access to Parties or Trust-Based Social Capital also populate the higher range of the 
other indexes (CoP, Community Engagement Citizen Affect) used in this study?  This 
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X. RESEARCH QUESTION FIVE 
A. DO MEMBERS POPULATING THE HIGHER RANGE OF ACCESS TO 
PARTIES OR TRUST BASED SOCIAL CAPITAL ALSO POPULATE 
THE HIGHER RANGE OF THIS STUDY’S OTHER INDEXES? 
Taking the communications-based research a step further, I tested for any 
relationships between the Trust-Based Social Capital and Access to Parties indexes, 
measures showing a significant correlation to the receiving communications, with the 
remaining “non-related indexes” to see if those CAN members scoring in the higher 
means on these indexes would also populate the group with the highest means on the 
other indexes. This was done to test for any indirect relationships related to the Coast 
Guard’s communications program (receipt or non-receipt of written/verbal 
communications) via the intermediary indexes holding the correlation relationship.  
To test for potential relationships, I split the Access and Trust index populations 
into two groups. These indexes were split at the mean to produce a high group (above the 
mean) and low group (below the mean). These bifurcated indices were tested against the 
other index measures, again using the Independent Samples t Test, which is robust test of 
the significance between any two groups. Both the Trust and Access “split at the means” 
groups were independent and no single respondent resided in both groups. 
The results in the tables below demonstrate a significant difference between the 
bifurcated Affect (five significant outcomes) and Trust (six significant outcomes) 
indexes. The split Affect measure showed no significant relationship with Community 
Engagement (p=.660) or Community Efficacy at (p=.132). Trust had no significant 
relationship with the Community Engagement Index (p=.85). 
The conclusion of these tests is that those respondents in the upper half of the 
Access and Trust Index also represented the higher means of most of the other indices. 
The differences in the means for the two groups were significant to a statistical certainty 
and could not have occurred by chance (see p values in Table y).  
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As the communication measures were demonstrated to be significant difference 
makers working into the Access and Trust indexes, the presumption is that these 
communication tools have a significant moderating or interacting effect on nearly every 
aspect of the network. This evidence suggests that even within an already motivated and 
engaged network, communications with members should be considered powerful 
predictors of increased success in CAN, as measured by almost all other indices. 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 7.   High Access and Trust Means Correlation Model. 
 
1. Communications as an Extrinsic Motivator 
Vigilance theory suggests that most individuals can apply themselves to vigilance 
(a task) and that conscientious persons will generally score higher than lesser-inclined 
individuals (on radar testing for instance). These findings demonstrate that a person’s true 
ability to attend to a vigilance display to the limit of their capacity requires extrinsic 
motivation in the form of knowledge of results, motivating instructions and the 
participants’ attitudes toward the experimenter.147  
Despite obvious differences between CAN and the experiment, the results of this 
research suggest that a vigilance-minded CoP, like CAN, would indeed respond 
                                                 
147 R. L. Smith, “Monotony and motivation: A theory of vigilance,” In D. R. Davies and R. 
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positively to Coast Guard-to-member communications or “extrinsic motivation.” 
Moreover, these findings may be seen as relating to every CoP input variable in this 
thesis. Consider: 
• Knowledge of Results = Access to Parties, Goal Clarity, Mutual 
Understanding 
• Motivating Instructions = Social Identification, Trust-Based Social Capital 
• Attitudes Toward Experimenter = Social Identification, Trust-Based 
Social Capital 
 
Tables 19 and 20 below show the t-test relationships where Access and Trust 
Indices were split at their means and subsequently tested against all other CoP, 
Community Engagement and Community Efficacy index measures. Low/Hi Access was 
significantly correlated to receipt of CAN newsletters and CG News E-mails (yes or no) 






























Table 19.   This table shows t-test relationships when the Access Index is split at its mean and 
tested against all other CoP, Community Engagement and Community Efficacy 
indexed measures. Low/Hi Access was significantly correlated to receipt of CAN 
newsletters and CG News E-mails (yes or no). 
 t-test for Equality of Means when tested against Access Index split at its mean 
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-7.438 146.737 .000   -1.280 -.742 
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Table 20.   This table shows t-test relationships when the Trust Index is split at its mean and 
tested against all other CoP, Community Engagement and Community Efficacy 
indexed measures.  Low/Hi Trust was significantly correlated to receipt of 
personal phone calls from the Coast Guard (yes or no). 
 t-test for Equality of Means when tested against Trust Index split at its mean 









95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 







assumed -4.366 178 .000 2.4493 3.1441 -1.008 -.380 
  Equal 
variances not 
assumed 







-5.043 182 .000 2.3750 3.2232 -1.180 -.516 
  Equal 
variances not 
assumed 






-8.818 182 .000 3.1597 4.1808 -1.249 -.792 
  Equal 
variances not 
assumed 







-3.039 181 .003 2.9930 3.5893 -.983 -.209 
  Equal 
variances not 
assumed 




-3.273 182 .001 3.6111 4.1131 -.804 -.199 
  Equal 
variances not 
assumed 







-2.196 182 .029 4.1759 4.4226 -.468 -.025 
  Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
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XI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The Committee is concerned that while terrorism prevention is a national 
priority, little is being done to create prevention expertise in our nation's 
first responders. This is in stark contrast to response and recovery training 
programs. Without a well-developed terrorism prevention plan, State and 
local agencies lack a key piece in the fight against terrorism. 
— House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, June 2004 
 
This thesis was developed to explore all possible aspects of a security-oriented 
networked community around tools, activities or leadership that might emphasize, 
encourage or educate citizens on the need for and utilization of vigilance.  
The survey measures used were designed around questions emphasizing volunteer 
education, understanding and action. This research was engineered to identify which 
independent variable or input constructs, if any, might foster vigilance — an important 
homeland security variable. This thesis examined the inner workings of an award-
winning Coast Guard-led networked community called the Citizen’s Action Network in 
an attempt to answer five research questions that could be utilized to develop a national 
standard for managing networked homeland security communities.  
1. Findings 
The research findings concluded that CAN membership includes higher-than-
average concentrations of military veterans, business owners and members of non-profit 
organizations (among others). CAN members also have higher Community Engagement 
and Community Affect levels than either randomly surveyed citizens or those in other 
government-led volunteer organizations.  
The research also demonstrated that CAN members joined as highly engaged 
citizens and stayed highly engaged during their membership tenure. CAN’s  
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organizational structure was found to fit that of a classic Community of Practice with 
vigilance supported as a unique outcome variable, and goal clarity as its strongest 
predictor index.  
Finally, those CAN members who received written or oral communications with 
the Coast Guard garnered significantly higher levels of Access to Parties and Trust-Based 
Social Capital measures. In turn, those who scored at the higher levels of these two 
indexes significantly correlated positively to nearly every other measurement index, thus 
pointing back to the power and value of leadership-to-member communications.   
2. A New HLS Business Model 
While the 9/11 Commission cited the intelligence community's "failure of 
imagination," the Coast Guard has done little beyond growing its tactical capabilities and 
assets to improve its citizen-based programs designed to counter its daunting post-9/11 
challenges.  
The fact is the Coast Guard is the smallest of the nation’s armed forces and has 
been charged with bringing security to a dynamic, unwieldy environment where foreign 
ships, their crews and hundreds of thousands of small vessels operate in and around our 
critical infrastructure. The Coast Guard needs the full support and cooperation of all loyal 
citizens within the Maritime Domain as force multipliers. 
Traditional Communities of Practice focus on augmenting or adding innovation to 
business processes. The dissection of CAN has demonstrated that vigilance too can be 
understood, instilled and utilized at the level of those who are also on the front lines of 
the GWOT. Building these types of CoPs will better enable the Coast Guard to carry out 
its myriad missions.  
In broader terms, vigilance may be seen as a new social science variable with a 
homeland security academic context worthy of further research because existing theory is 




animal survival studies. Ultimately, program-inspired vigilance can serve not just the 
Coast Guard, but every other state, local or federal agency where leaders engage publics 
in any domain.  
3. CAN-Like Community Policing 
Through a CoP-like organization, CAN delivers grass-roots services to the Coast 
Guard along the lines of a philosophy called community policing that, according to the 
Department of Justice, traditionally “focuses on crime and social disorder through the 
delivery of police services that includes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as 
prevention, problem-solving, community engagement, and partnerships.”148  
Community policing creates channels through which information flows and trust 
is built to the mutual benefit of the collective. Additionally, social scientists suggest that 
communities that bank social capital though broad participation in communal 
improvement programs experience very little crime.”149 Significant to this research 
question, social science theory suggests that these types of healthy collaborative networks 
embody past success, which evolve as cultural templates for future collaboration on other 
problems. This statement suggests that the roots of CAN lie in a similar collaborative and 
problem-solving network as those within community policing models. While CAN 
maintains an international scope, its core concepts are similar to a neighborhood policing 
model.   
CAN is built on the notion that citizens should be empowered to help prevent or 
respond to the litany of all-hazards missions or maritime problems. The byproduct of this 
empowerment is the development of positive, goal-oriented teamwork that produces 
psychological benefits, builds trust and increased social capital. Social scientists tell us 
that networks of engaged citizens facilitate extended communal coordination and  
 
                                                 
148 United States Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. “What is 
Community Policing,” http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=36 (accessed August 13, 2007).  
149 Susan Saegert, Gary Winkel, and Charles Swartz, “Social Capital and Crime in New York City’s 
Low Income Housing,” Housing Policy Debate 13, no. 1 (2002): 218, 
http://fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1301_saegert.pdf (accessed August 11, 2007). 
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communication. This community engagement phenomenon has been successfully tapped 
for years by community police leaders in setting up and running neighborhood watch 
programs to various levels of success.  
Social Scientist Robert Putnam suggests that increased social capital has 
significant political consequences such as the promotion of political participation and 
healthy democratic government. He claims that, since 9/11, more citizens are now more 
inclined to re-engage in their communities,150 as they are “…more united, readier for 
collective sacrifice and more attuned to public purpose…a window of opportunity has 
opened for a sort of civic renewal that occurs only once or twice in a century…”151.   
Professors John and Mary Kirlin claim that motivation, skills and network 
connections contribute to increased civic engagement, but the government’s responses to 
9/11 have not addressed nor taken advantage of these critical factors. They insist that the 
government must provide the institutional context for societal action to include 
“sustained commitment to combating terrorism.”152 They claim that increased civic 
engagement strengthens democracy and can contribute to the development of public 
judgment, which is critical to sustaining support of efforts to thwart terrorism.  
The research presented in this thesis demonstrates that the Citizen’s Action 
Network is a networked community that inspires connections, community engagement 
and grassroots motivation. It is the kind of organization that Putnam praises, and the 
Kirlin’s lament has not been provided by the government in the critical post-9/11 era. 
CAN’s structure parallels that of a Community of Practice, but one that is completely 
new to the Coast Guard and homeland security.  
As a networked community, CAN represents a new working model — a best 
practice for building a grassroots culture of prevention that capitalizes on broad and 
inspired citizenry. CAN helps carry out the important duties of protecting the nation as  
 
                                                 
150 Putnam, “Bowling Alone,” and Putnam and Feldstein, “Better Together.” 
151 Putnam, “Bowling Together.” 
152 Ibid, 84.  
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these citizens, or any other un-affiliated maritime-oriented citizen, are by far more 
familiar with their waterfront communities and are therefore in the best position to help 
create effective solutions to unique problems.  
This thesis provides rich research material to continue further homeland security-
directed research in security- and safety-minded Communities of Practice as well as 
vigilance as a new outcome variable for CoPs. Finally, it demonstrates that government 
agencies can utilize communications tools to develop a sense of access and trust in its 
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APPENDIX 
A.  SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
Hello, May I please speak with_______?  How are you doing Mr(s). _________?  My name 
is ________. I am calling from the United States Coast Guard’s regional headquarters in 
Seattle, Washington. 
 
When you enrolled in the Citizen’s Action Network (a.k.a. Northwest Watch) you became 
part of an important citizen based approach to better managing our waterways.  
 
We are conducting a survey to measure Network member’s perception of the program and 
how it facilitates information exchange between yourselves and the Coast Guard. 
 
This study will help us understand how to best manage the network as it grows. Your opinion 
is very important to us and what you tell us will be kept confidential.  
 
In this survey, we will ask you about your experiences while in the Citizen’s Action Network 
as well as your experiences in your community.   
 
Can we count on your participation? (It will not take long.) (We can call back at a more 
convenient time.) 
 




1. What is your gender?  Male /  Female 
 
2. How old are you?      _____  years old     
 
3. Are you… 
 
A member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary 
A Canadian citizen 
A U.S. Citizen   
A Business owner 




Just a few questions about your Citizen’s Action Network affiliation 
 





5.  Have you received any of the following (Yes/No)? 
 
CG CAN Newsletters____      
CG CAN News and information releases via email____     
Phone calls from the Coast Guard for my assistance or information_____ (if so, how 
many times?) 
I’ve never received anything from the Coast Guard or CAN____ 
 
Community of Practice (COP) Questions: 
 
COP Relation Measurement 
Please indicate whether in general you agree or disagree with the following 
statements on a scale from One to Five, One meaning you strongly disagree and Five 
being you strongly agree… (strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 strongly agree) 
 
6.  Most people in the Coast Guard are basically honest and can be trusted. 
 
7.  If I have a problem with the Coast Guard’s methods there is always someone to help 
me. 
 
8.  I would pay attention to the opinions of others in the CAN network if made available 
to me. 
 
9.  Most people in the Coast Guard are willing to help if you need it. 
 
10.  I feel accepted as a member of the CAN team.  
 
11.  If you are not able to complete an activity at a given time, another member of the 
CAN network will do it.  
 
12.  I feel strong ties with this team  
 
13. I experience a strong sense of belonging to this team. 
 
14.  I feel proud to work in this team 
 
15.  I am glad to be a member of this team. 
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16. My understanding of the maritime environment has increased since becoming a CAN 
member. 
 
17. My understanding of maritime threats has increased since becoming a CAN member. 
 
18. My understanding of the Coast Guard’s missions has increased since becoming a 
CAN member. 
 
19. My understanding of the Department of Homeland Security’s missions has increased 
since becoming a CAN member. 
 
20. I am more vigilant (on the lookout) for unusual activity on or around the water since 
becoming a CAN member. 
 




COP Mutual Understanding Measurement         
 
On a scale of One to Five, (strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 strongly agree) do you agree or 
disagree that Coast Guard C.A.N managers…  
 
22.  Have a good “map” of each team member’s talents and skills. 
 
23.  Know their skills and how they relate to the network’s capabilities. 
 




COP Access to Parties Measurement      
 
In terms of information sharing practices of the Citizen’s Action Network, you are 
satisfied with the… 
(strongly disagree 1 2 3 4 5 strongly agree) 
 
25.  Information that is available to you from the Coast Guard to help you perform your 
activities.  
 
26.  Way information is managed within the network. 
 
27.  Information sharing among network members. 
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COP Network Measurement 
 
On a scale of One to Five, One being never and Five being very frequently, when 
performing your activities as a part of the team, to what extent do you exchange 
communication through…(Never 1 2 3 4 5 Very Frequently) 
 
28.  Phone calls with the Coast Guard? 
 
29.  Electronic tasking with the Coast Guard? 
 
30.  E-mails with the Coast Guard? 
 
Community Engagement Measurement 
 
31.  How many years have you lived in your community?     ____ years 
 
On a scale of One to Five, One being Not at all and Five being Very much so… 
(Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 Very Much So) 
 
32.  Do you feel like you are a part of your local community? 
 
33.  How closely do you follow local news and affairs in your community? 
 
34.  How often would you say that you have ideas for improving things in your 
community? 
 
35.  How often do you get together with people to talk about ways to improve your 
community?   
 
36.  How often do you participate in activities to make things better in your community? 
 
Civic/Community Efficacy  
The next set of questions deal with Neighborhood Obligations. 
Do you feel that each of the following is a very important obligation, a somewhat important 
obligation, or not an important obligation (Not important=1, Somewhat important=2, Very 
important=3)? 
37) Reporting a crime you may have witnessed. 
38) Participating in neighborhood organizations. 
39) Helping keep the neighborhood safe. 
40) Helping keep the neighborhood clean and beautiful. 
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41) Helping those who are less fortunate. 
Civic Obligations 
42) Serving on a jury if called. 
43) Voting in elections. 
44) Keeping informed about news and public issues. 
Personal Effectiveness of Community Service 
Thinking about your community service activities in the past 12 months…on a scale of One 
to Five, One being strongly disagree and Five being strongly agree, how do you feel about 
the following statements?  (Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Agree) 
45) I felt like I made a contribution to the community. 
46) I felt like part of a community. 
47) I felt I could make a difference in the life of at least one person. 
Local Civic Efficacy 
Think about how hard it would be for you to accomplish each of the following activities, I 
would not be able to get this done (1), I might be able to get this done (2), I would be able to 
get this done (3): 
48) Getting the local government to fix a pothole on my street. 
49) Getting the local government to build an addition to the community center. 
50) Getting an issue on the ballot for a state -wide election. 
 
Next, we'd like to ask you about community activities you may have done in the last 12 
months.   
 
On a scale of One to Five, One being Never and Five being Very Often, How often have 
you…        




How often have you… circle one per row please 
51.  Worked on community projects Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very 
Often
52.  Signed a petition Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very 
Often
53.  Attended a political meeting or rally Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very 
Often
54.  Participated in any demonstrations, 
protests, boycotts, or marches  
Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very 
Often
 
Now we have a few questions about how often you participated in the following types 
of community groups in the past 12 months. 
 
How often would you say you participated in… circle one per row please 
55.  A parents' association, such as the 
PTA or PTO, or other school support or 
service groups 
Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very 
Often
56.  A neighborhood association, like a 
block association, a homeowner or 
tenant association, or a crime watch 
group 
Never Rarely Occasionally Often Very 
Often
57.  Service clubs or fraternal 
organizations 






-What motivated you join C.A.N.? 
 
- What do you like about CAN? 
 
- In your opinion, how could we improve CAN? 
 
-Would you be willing to take part in some very specific follow up questions at a later 
time? 
 
B.  ADAPTATION OF WEB 2.0 APPLICATIONS TO BEST ENABLE MDA 
The primary potential benefit of Web 2.0 applications for the Coast Guard is the 
instantiations flow of information from a maritime social network. In Web 1.0 
applications, users had to visit to web pages to access information to include having to 
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follow a series of links (via. directories or search engines) to arrive (or not) as a desired 
WWW location.  Now websites have the ability to push, share or multi-source distribute 
information to users through propagated web feeds – essentially creating dynamic 
information flows to unlimited audiences. Web 2.0 technologies can allow the Coast 
Guard to migrate from pushing information vertically through a hierarchical organization 
to posting and smart pulling information vertically, horizontally and independently.   This 
transformation to Web 2.0 technologies will be a key for success within any organization, 
including militaries, to function in the Information Age.153  
The Web 2.0 tool bag offers an enhanced capacity for social collaboration.  An 
early mainstream collaboration tool, for instance, was Napster.  It was one of the first 
large person-to-person (P2P) file sharing systems allowing users to share digital music 
files through a server providing an index of file locations.  The service itself had no 
server for storage, instead, it only showed people where to find them and facilitated in 
downloading them from other user’s computers. Napster would have been useless 
without its users sharing their files, because there would have been no selection of music 
for users to download from.  Other Web 2.0 dynamics can theoretically harness the 
energies and collaborative input of the masses offers a new opportunity for the Coast 
Guard.  With the appropriate internet tools applications, it could harness the broad 
benefits of scale free social networks (as forwarded by Barabasi) as they appear in 
Communities of Purpose/Interest.  After all, as James Surowiecki suggests in his book 
The Wisdom of Crowds, large groups of people are smarter than an elite few, no matter 
how brilliant they are.  He provides evidence that large groups are better at solving 
problems, fostering innovation and coming to wise decisions.154   
Applying these collaborative web tools in Coast Guard Operations Centers could 
add significant value to maritime operations as the centers are already a hub of network 
                                                 
153 David Alberts and Richard E. Hayes. 2003. Power to the edge: Command, control in the 
information age. Information age transformation series. Washington, DC: CCRP Publication Series: 120.  
Found in, Joshua D. O’Sullivan, Thesis, A Concept of Operations for the use of Emergent Open Internet 
Technologies as the Basis for a Network-Centric Environment. Naval Postgraduate School (September 
2006). 
154 James Surowiecki. The Wisdom of Crowds. 
http://www.randomhouse.com/features/wisdomofcrowds/, (accessed October 9, 2006).  
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activity and information – albeit limited in scope and capabilities. Enabling the Coast 
Guard to become more network-centric is an important concept to consider as it is 
battling the asymmetric threat of terrorism as acknowledged in the National Plan to 
Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness.  As such, the theory supporting “Netwar” and 
how to maximize networks during conflict should be considered here.   
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt coined the use of the term “Netwar”155 to 
describe asymmetric conflict that is less than war.   Arquilla explains that Netwar’s are 
likely due in part to the information revolution described above.  And, that the “state” 
may grow stronger through adaptation of a networked over a hierarchical stance,156 but 
adaptation or adjustments to such a position will be difficult and time consuming.157 He 
warns that actors positioned to take advantage of networking are being strengthened 
faster than actors embedded in old hierarchical structures.158  Thus we can reason that 
protagonists need to use the strength and speed of networks to communicate and conduct 
decentralized operations supporting dense, “all-channel” communications among all 
nodes. Arquilla explains that Netwar characteristics tend to erode the power of 
hierarchies such that a network approach is needed to defeat a network, and the first 
organization to master the networked form of operations will have a distinct advantage. 
1.  Operations Supported by Networks  
Thomas Friedman forwarded the term Globalization 3.0 in his book The World is 
Flat.159  He argues that individuals are no longer required to be bound to companies or 
nation-states to operate or influence others on a global scale. This thought is 
revolutionary as small groups or single persons can tap communication capabilities 
previously controlled only by national powers or the elite. With Globalization 3.0, he 
argues that information resources are becoming the most important because, unlike the 
                                                 
155 John Arquilla et al., The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica: RAND 1996). 82. 
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR789/ (accessed October 9, 2006). 
156 Ibid, 34. 
157 Ibid, 41 
158 Ibid, 43 
159 Thomas Friedman. 2005. The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. 1st ed. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux: 9. 
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resources of previous times, information is not bounded by a physical domain. An 
individual, or a network of individuals, can function unchained from nation-state 
governments or multi-national companies, thus they can compete in projecting influence 
unrestrained by the participants scale. One of his primary case examples was the 
networking conducted by the 9/11 hijackers; essentially highlighting the power of loosely 
associated but broadly connected social networks.   
Friedman’s term Globalization 3.0, and the broad power behind it can, to a large 
extent, be broken down into empowering Internet-based constructs. These constructs, 
specifically, have been dubbed Web 2.0160 by publisher Tim O’Reilly who, along with 
industry leaders, held the first “where is the internet going” conference on the matter in 
2004. One of the central principles forwarded at this conference was that Web 1.0 leaders 
who survived to see Web 2.0 did so by embracing web power to harness collective 
intelligence. Key Web 2.0 networking themes of importance to this thesis include: 
 
• Control over unique, hard-to-recreate data sources 
• Trusting users as co-developers 
• Harnessing collective intelligence 
• Architecture of participation 
 
2.  Current Social Networking Picture 
One of the greatest weaknesses cited by the 9/11 Commission was a lack of 
intelligence fusion between respective government agencies.  The Coast Guard has 
developed and is building a national chain of Joint Harbor Operation Centers (JHOC) to 
enable tactical interagency fusion via an array of multi-agency intelligence databases and 
sensors.  As noted in part one of this paper however, there are no databases or sensors 
associated with the Coast Guard’s national-level outreach program called America’s 
                                                 
160 O’Reilly – What Is Web 2.0? Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of 
Software. http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html (accessed 
October 9, 2006). 
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Waterway Watch.  Simply, the program managers hope to attract a following by offering 
a web site and supplying a specialized phone number for reporting.  
a.  The Baseline – Social Networking 1.0 
In the vernacular of this paper we can call the AWW program Social 
Networking 1.0 (SN 1.0) – a somewhat archaic tool which parallels the Web 1.0 
limitations identified by Tim O’Reilly.161  The AWW program limits are similar to those 
experienced by a single or proprietary software provider.  In this analogy, participants 
(reporters) have to visit a massive installed base (Coast Guard Headquarters Web Site) 
and tightly integrated operating system (one has to call all a specific number or they can’t 
participate) without any hope of users generating control of the AWW programming 
paradigm since there are no protocols for feedback or process improvement – essentially 







                                                 
161 O’Reilly – What Is Web 2.0? 
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b.  Evolution is the Solution 
The Northwest United State’s regional approach to social networking with 
a maritime security emphasis is called Citizen’s Action Network – or SN 1.5.  While not 
attaining the highest promises of Web 2.0 philosophy, there is a distinctive improvement 
over AWW’s SN 1.0 levels – namely its custom integration with its users (customized to 
their capabilities based on location and talents) as well as the continuing opportunity for 
customer feedback or collective intelligence – the kind derived from highly networked 
scale-free or Community of Practice social networks.   
 
 
c.  The Next Step, SN 2.0 
The potential benefits of totally integrated Web 2.0/SN 2.0 (Open 
Standard/web feed) applications for the Coast Guard within the emerging JHOC 
infrastructure is rich as it offers interoperability and agility to communicate rapidly and to 
a broad audience.  Web 2.0 constructs provide a wealth of new opportunities in the world 
of information. Currently, Coast Guard networks allow for minimal information flow in 
part based on its prevalent use of Web 1.0 style systems and proprietary software.  
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The concepts and constructs inherent in Web 2.0 soft technologies will be 
critical to growing Coast Guard information network to support the JHOC’s Network-
centric philosophy.  Adding the ability to groom, build and tap into scale free social 
structures to these applications magnifies COPs/COIs potential.  Coast Guard web feeds, 
portals, blogs and wikis: 
 
• Facilitates efficient information sharing internally and externally with 
COPs/COIs through supporting and adapting to open-standard tools and open-
source systems.  
 
• Web feeds could facilitate information flow and allow information to go to 
heretofore unknown but valuable users. 
 
• Scale-free network of social clusters can provide decentralized content to a 
centralized source. 
 
• Information flows rapidly back and forth to those who want or need it. 
 
• COPs/COIs help craft their own operating picture. 
 
 113
• COPs/COIs are not only consumers, but producers – this is highly important in 





There are many challenges to adopting this type of system.  Network 
security and virus protection are of paramount concern to the Coast Guard’s IT 
professionals.  Thus, managing far flung networks with unknown backgrounds will limit 
the growth and/or acceptance of this new way of doing business. 
 

















AWW (SN 1.0) Yes Yes Yes No No 
CAN (SN 1.5) Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
????  (SN 2.0) No No No Yes Yes 
Here, each of the SN standards are compared against Web 2.0 opportunities. 
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C.  TAPPING CITIZEN INFORMATION RESOURCES 
In its Secure Seas Strategy, the Department of Homeland Security recommends 
homeland security practitioners take a layered approach to maritime security. This 
approach includes establishing partnerships with the private sector and state and local 
authorities to create a system of different measures to better ensure protective layers are 
in place from one end of a sea-based journey to the other.162 Much of the effectiveness of 
this method relies on information collection and distribution amongst myriad customers 
to manage today’s risks because, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, it’s the smart 
government that integrates all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole.163   
Building and grooming partners in a layered maritime security approach is 
especially important as, according to the Office of the Inspector General, the Coast 
Guard’s capabilities are currently stretched.  The Annual Review of Mission Performance 
Report discloses that: “The Coast Guard is not meeting all of its performance goals, 
despite steady increases in mission hours.  For the homeland security missions, the Coast 
Guard achieved only 26% of its goals.”164  Without significant funding or manpower on 
the horizon, the Coast Guard will need to fill this homeland security gap through 
improving, formalizing or creating processes that enhance government-to-citizen-to-
government field information collecting and communications.  Guidance for potential 
process improvements at the citizen level lay within Title 33, Code of Federal 
Regulations Subchapter H.165  Promulgated under the Maritime Transportation Security 
                                                 
162 Secure Seas, Open Ports Keeping our waters safe, secure and open for business. June 21, 2004. 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/DHSPortSecurityFactSheet-062104.pdf accessed September 24, 
2007. 
163 The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, Official Government Edition, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/sec13.pdf, 
(accessed September 24, 2006), 401. 
164 Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, “Annual Review of Mission 
Performance 2005,” http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_06-50_Jul06.pdf (accessed September 
18, 2006), 4. 
165 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Subchapter H (Maritime Security); § 101.305 
Reporting. (a) Notification of suspicious activities. An owner or operator required to have a security plan 
under part 104, 105, or 106 of this subchapter shall, without delay, report activities that may result in a 
transportation security incident to the National Response Center at the following toll free telephone: 1–
800–424– 8802, direct telephone: 202–267–2675, fax: 202–267–2165, TDD: 202–267–4477, or Email: lst-
nrcinfo@comdt.uscg.mil. Any other person or entity is also encouraged to report activities that may result 
in a transportation security incident to the National Response Center. 
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Act (MTSA) of 2002, these regulations include a formal system for mandatory security 
breech reporting requirements for owners or operators of vessels or facilities.  Further, 
these MTSA customers’ information and communications needs are serviced via 
methodology contained in The Domestic Outreach Plan (DOP).166 The Coast Guard 
carries out its DOP information obligation to key stakeholders through Homeport, a 
password-protected WWW site that acts as a communication and information exchange 
venue.   The spirit of this formal approach yields clear expectations on what security 
incidents are, reinforces what’s important via the aforementioned Homeport system, and 
builds on a networked team atmosphere through Coast Guard led meetings and 
customer/venue visits under the MTSA’s inspection guidance.  The Coast Guard 
maintains this comprehensive approach with maritime industry leadership but has yet to 
formally utilize this approach amongst those millions of citizens who live, work or play 
along our ninety-five thousand miles of national coastline.   
In its information collection relationship with our citizens, the Coast Guard 
depends on a passive approach to information collection called America's Waterway 
Watch (AWW). Established in the wake of 9/11, the program’s stated goal is 
“…encouraging participants to simply report suspicious activity to the Coast Guard 
and/or other law enforcement agencies.”167 Pamphlets, a web site and word of mouth are 
the primary tools used by the Coast Guard to encourage citizens to report suspicious 
activity to the National Response Center (NRC). However, the lack of routine 
communications between agency and prospective vigilant citizen may be problematic to 
building or sustaining a well informed and networked security layer as is proposed in the 
aforementioned Secure Seas Strategy.   
Weaknesses in the AWW system start with the special reporting phone number 
(1-877-24-Watch), designed to connect a caller to the National Response Center. The 
center’s web site claims that, “Any incident related to terrorism or possible terrorist 
                                                 
166 The Domestic Outreach Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime Security, October 2005 
(accessed May 15, 2006) Available from: 
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSPD_DomesticOutreach.pdf. 
167 United States Coast Guard, America’s Waterway Watch. http://www.americaswaterwaywatch.org/ 
(accessed September 24, 2006). 
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activity requires telephonic notification to the National Response Center.”168 However 
clear this requirement is, citizens simply have a hard time remembering the number.  In 
an informal poll conducted by this author, 20 of 20 Coast Guard members couldn’t 
remember the number when asked. Additionally, generating citizen vigilance on the 
water through messaging alone is difficult.  Red Cross studies point out that people must 
hear a message more than 20 times before they take their first step.169 By operating 
AWW as a “call us if you see something” message-driven program, the organization is 
risking valuable and timely receipt of field information.   Broadening the AWW program 
to follow similar communication trends forwarded in the earlier mentioned 33 CFR and 
MTSA guidelines, I suggest, could greatly enhance and grow the AWW’s program. 
Business design researchers170 suggest that members who belong to a formal or 
informal organization and work toward a common goal through informal associations 
are often defined as communities of practice (COP). They argue that an organization 
can be seen to consist of numerous, often overlapping, but rarely formally recognized 
communities of practice -- informal structures that exists in parallel with more formal 
forms of organization. Thus, citizens living in towns and cities in and around waterways 
who hold common interests in their environment or their community can, by definition, 
be considered a community of practice if the product is considered the quality or amount 
of actionable information coming from a community. The COP literature suggests the 
Coast Guard would derive positive social and business synergies above and beyond what 
had been planned for or designed into an organization’s original design.171 Specifically, 
the literature suggests leaders open a dialog between process owners and those outside 
                                                 
168 National Response Center, http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/terrorism.html (accessed September 24, 
2006). 
169 Eric E. Holdeman, Government Technology “Emergency Management Magazine Public 
Education: Is it Important?” August 2006. http://www.emergencymgmt.com/story.php?id=100498 
(accessed September 24, 2006). 
170 Eric Lesser, “Communities of practice and organizational performance,” IBM systems Journal40, 
no. 4, Armonk: 2001, 831-842 and Etienne Wenger, “Communities of practice,” The organizational frontier 
Harvard Business Review 78, no. 1  Boston: (January/February 2000): 139-146. 
171 Found in Communities of Practice for Homeland Security, NPS NS4156 Module 3 posting by M. 
A. Billeaudeaux, https://www.chds.us/courses/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=4170 (accessed September 24, 
2006). 
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these circles. They argue that reaching out helps leaders understand that they might not 
have the best solutions. They suggest that programmatic vision that looks beyond it own 
center will generate a better perspective; this includes bringing in those players who hold 
a periphery or secondary commitment to the issue/goal or mission. Researchers theorize 
that COPs have a tendency to include three layers of committed members. They suggest 
that the largest group is the least connected but is still very valuable to the operation and 
should be allowed to participate at their comfort or capability level.  Many citizen based 
programs have adopted incorporating these recommendations -- AWW could too. 
Two other active maritime security networks routinely capitalize on their 
community of practice recommendations.172 The Coast Guard’s regional Citizen’s Action 
Network and their partners, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s Coastal Watch, have 
achieved significant “business” results through the incorporation of many COP concepts 
to include face-to-face visits, formal training and consistent communications. Coastal 
Watch and Citizen’s Action Network leadership invest in their maritime citizen networks 
thus capturing and putting into practice a philosophy that Thomas Jefferson spoke of 
nearly 200 years ago. He wrote, “I know of no safe depository of the ultimate power of 
the society but the people themselves...” Although he wasn’t referring to maritime 
security, the concept makes sense. Consider, for example, the following programmatic 
accomplishments:   
• A participant observed small vessel approach their shore from 
nearby island at night and without lights. After reporting the 
situation via the regional proscribed method, an investigation was 
launched on nearby island which revealed a methamphetamine lab 
in a pre-production phase. 
• Participants were immediately placed on watch in response to a 
bomb threat to a major bridge.  Immediate feedback from network 
members allowed for an instant field assessment before authorities 
arrived and during the investigation. 
                                                 
172 Etienne Wenger, “Communities of practice, The organizational frontier,” Harvard Business 
Review, 78, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 139-146 
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• Member assistance was called on in locating a suspect vessel that 
was evading detection. RCMP called upon their Coastal Watchers 
and the suspect vessel was twice located and reported in transit. 
Information was relayed to the USCG who affected a successful 
apprehension. 
• A CAN member called the Coast Guard after sighting a suspicious 
cylinder which had washed up on a community beach.  The 
member summarily sent in digital images.  The Coast Guard sent 
investigators to the scene and assessed it to be hazardous.  The 
cylinder was safely removed and disposed of.  
• A Canadian citizen observed and reported a decrepit vessel which 
matched Coastal Watch profiles.  The RCMP responded to this 
report and apprehended 159 migrants on board. 
• A man stole a 42-foot yacht and fled with a hostage.  Several CAN 
program members were called up and put on watch.  After three 
hours of searching with Coast Guard, marine police and CAN 
members, the vessel was identified and an arrest is made.  The 
hostage was released safely.  
 
Similar terrestrial-based, post 9/11, citizen-to-government information programs 
have flourished through their implementation of COP “business” processes. USA on 
Watch,173 for example, empowers citizens through neighborhood watch programs which 
incorporate training, informational processes and volunteer hand’s on work in securing 
neighborhoods. The Highway Watch program’s mission is to have truck drivers assist in 
ensuring the safety and security of the nation by providing training to transportation 
professionals who collectively observe, assess, report and respond to items or incidents 
which might pose a threat to the highway system. Members are assigned numbers and use 
them when they report to the program’s Information Sharing and Analysis Center; a 
component of the Department of Homeland Security information network. As the 
receiving point of more than 300,000 trained and uniquely identified members, the center 
                                                 
173 USA on Watch, http://www.usaonwatch.org/AboutUs/AboutUSAOnWatch.htm (accessed 
September 13, 2006). 
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serves as the program’s analytical and communications focal point.  Highway Watch and 
USA on Watch represent only a fraction of the many terrestrial-based “engagement” 
programs which utilize COP concepts to enhance their information collection mission.   
The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines homeland security as “a 
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism…”  Until appropriate measures are taken at the 
national level, AWW will maintain itself as a maritime reporting program that can’t live 
up to the challenges set forth in the National Strategy for Homeland Security or the 
Secure Seas Strategy. The passive AWW program can be improved through the 
program’s implementation of tested, result-driven business methods identified in this 
paper.  Through membership, communications and training the Coast Guard can greatly 
enhance its field information collection mission; after all, Scientia Est Potentia, 
“Knowledge is Power”.  
D.  CANADIAN AND AMERICAN NATIONAL APPROACHES TO 
CITIZEN-BASED MARITIME SECURITY PROGRAMS – A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
In 1999 the Canadian Government, concerned with terrorism, wrote: “The nature 
of terrorism has been changing steadily since the end of the Cold War. Many factors are 
driving this change, including the erosion of national borders, the increasing ease of 
travel, the revolution in technology and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.” More importantly the statement identified the means by which Canada 
could mount the best defense; it proclaimed: 
Preventing terrorist activity very much depends on the collection, analysis 
and dissemination of information and intelligence, and on cooperation 
between jurisdictions, levels of government and the private sector. 174 
Three years later Canada’s southern neighbor published its National Strategy for 
Homeland Security. It defined homeland security as a concerted national effort to prevent 
                                                 
174 Safety and Security for Canada, Operational Programs, Counter Terrorism, Government of 
Canada’s Response to the Report of the Special Senate Committee on Security and Intelligence (1999), 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/zroom/cm/ns3028/csis-
counterterror2002.pdf&code=c5665facbb1a45708896437d88197a10 (accessed March 11, 2007). 
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terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”175  To carry out these goals 
the administration stated that it too relies on: 
…principles of shared responsibility and partnership with the Congress, 
state and local governments, the private sector and the American people 
(my italics).    
These two definitive statements highlight the commonality between each nation in 
its domestic efforts against terrorists. Both cite the inexorably linked and highly 
important broad-based intelligence collection at all levels of government; from the 
highest-paid federal professional down to the private sector and citizens of each country. 
While taking a common approach in recruiting all levels of societal leadership to collect, 
analyze and disseminate intelligence looked invitingly similar in the heady days leading 
into the publication of the groundbreaking U.S. Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, a 
very decisive turn was taken by the United States radically changing America’s approach 
to citizen-based intelligence collection. 
Between the draft and final versions of the Homeland Security Act, a key and 
high profile program defining federal citizen engagement for collecting filed 
intelligence/information was dropped from further development as it was too 
controversial amongst some politicians and civil rights activists. Operation TIPS, a 
citizen information collection plan designed and proposed by the Justice Department, was 
killed by then House majority leader Dick Armey and others such as the ACLU176 vowed 
not to let “Americans to spy on one another.”177  The follow up to these concerns was the 
repeal of Operation TIPS subsequently published within the HSA’s own section 880 
stating, “any and all activities of the Federal Government to implement the proposed 
                                                 
175 Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington D.C: 
Office of Homeland Security, 2002), 2.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html (accessed 
August 14, 2006). 
176 American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17109prs20021114.html 
(acessed September 13, 2007. 
177 Nat Hentoff, “The Death of Operation TIPS Volunteer Spying Corps Dismissed,” 
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0251,hentoff,40587,6.html (accessed September 13, 2006). 
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component program of the Citizen Corps known as Operation TIPS (Terrorism 
Information and Prevention System) are hereby prohibited”.178 One author cynically 
noted, “Let’s be real: Terrorists with half a brain aren’t likely to be outsmarted by the 
mailman or open the door to have the gas meter read if they have bomb-making material 
nearby. But ordinary people, who might be reading the Koran, will. The result could be a 
flood of unsubstantiated and largely irrelevant tips that overwhelm law-enforcement 
officials already mired in data. Worst of all, the program could sow the seeds of suspicion 
among loyal American citizens.”179 
Important to the thesis of this comparative paper is the concept that section 880 
seemingly delivered a death blow to the concept of a large, formal, federal-level 
centralized leadership to citizen-based LE information collection. Since the death of 
Operation TIPS the concept of grass roots engagement has been a strategic no show in 
every major post-9/11 national strategy document. Individual federal agencies have, 
however, cobbled together several lesser-known approached designed to pick up where 
TIPS left off. 
While Canadians have voiced concerns over its own internal collection efforts, it 
has not faced the ferocious response fomented by Operation TIPS. Indeed, the Canadian 
Government has taken a much different approach with the spirit of grass-roots 
cooperation squarely planted within Canada’s National Security Policy’s opening 
chapter. It states: “The Government needs the help and support of all Canadians to make 
its approach to security effective. Therefore, it will introduce new measures to reach out 
to communities in Canada that may feel caught in the “front lines” of the struggle against 
terrorism.”180 
                                                 
178 The Homeland Security Act 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf (accessed March 6, 2007). 
179 Jane Black, “Some TIPS for John Ashcroft.” Found in National Security in a Post-9/11 World: 
The Rise of Surveillance … the Demise of Privacy? Green College University of British Columbia Ann 
Cavoukian, Ph.D. Commissioner, May 2003, http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/up-nat_sec.pdf 
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180 Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, April 2004, http://www.pco-
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The clearly divergent approaches to citizen-based intelligence collection offer a 
poignant opportunity to compare and contrast the opposing federal approaches in an 
attempt to parse out best practices. This paper will concentrate on collection efforts 
within the maritime domain.181 
1.  The U.S. Grassroots Maritime Intelligence Collection Program 
Since the failure of Operation TIPS in the United States, proponent language 
within our national security strategies alluding to a positive cause and effect relationship 
between security and citizen engagement (beyond encouraging participation in awareness 
and reporting campaigns) is almost nonexistent – especially in respect to the maritime 
arena.  For instance, the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 
uses the word citizen only one time to innoxiously help explain the Global Maritime 
Community of Interest.182 Otherwise, the concept of citizen engagement remains elusive. 
The federal government as a whole, with the exception of its establishment of Citizen 
Corps in 2002, has largely taken a hands-off approach to encouraging citizens to engage 
in prevention-centric homeland security roles for reasons ranging from potential legal 
concerns, lack of strategic imagination or lack of time and money in developing new 
process. 
The only national method for maritime citizen engagement to support MDA is a 
maritime awareness program whose concept is forwarded in The Department of 
Homeland Security’s Secure Seas, Open Ports Strategy.183  Known as America’s 
Waterway Watch (AWW), the Coast Guard-run program simply encourages all citizens 
to be on the lookout for unusual or suspicious activity in and around the nation’s 
                                                 
181 The maritime domain, according to the National Strategy for Maritime Security, is defined as all 
areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable 
waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other 
conveyances. 
182 Global Maritime Community of Interest (GMCOI) includes, among other interests, the federal, 
state, and local departments and agencies with responsibilities in the maritime domain. Because certain 
risks and interests are common to government, business, and citizen alike, community membership also 
includes public, private and commercial stakeholders, as well as foreign governments and international 
stakeholders. 
183 Department of Homeland Security, Secure Seas, Open Ports, Keeping our waters safe, secure and 
open for business, June 21, 2004. http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/DHSPortSecurityFactSheet-
062104.pdf (accessed October 5, 2006), 4. 
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waterways and report what they see via a toll-free hotline number. AWW’s program 
managers rely on word of mouth, brochures and a web site as their primary means for 
educating the public on what and to where they should make reports.   
As an awareness program, AWW provides no opportunities for the Coast Guard 
to follow up with citizens who might know of the AWW program, no method for tracking 
breaking situations, no method for routine citizen training and no real-time method for 
government-to-citizen communication or collaboration. Further, the Coast Guard’s AWW 
program managers are physically and procedurally disassociated from their call center, 
the National Response Center (NRC). While the NRC operators field a diversity of 
reports from myriad national “customers”, there is no current method to determine if 
incoming calls are outcomes of citizen’s following AWW protocols, other mandated 
reporting methods or some other method. Thus, the AWW program can not qualify the 
genesis of the reporting source’s call impetus. The program can not claim a cause and 
effect correlation and currently exists without a confirmed prevention or response success 
for which it can claim direct responsibility.184   
2. Canada’s Grass Roots Maritime Intelligence Collection Program 
While private security companies provide security for Canada’s port facilities 
(similar to the United States’ approach) the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) 
role in maritime national security is to protect against terrorism, crime and border 
security, specifically at the ports. 185 186  To help carry out their charter the RCMP 
formed a pan-national Coastal/Airport Watch Program specifically to, “…assist in the 
identification of persons, vessels, vehicles and aircraft that may constitute a threat to 
Canada’s national security, or that are involved in illegal activities such as drug 
importation.” According the Canadian Government, the RCMP also works directly with 
its national Marine Security Operations Centers “to bring together civilian and military 
                                                 
184 According to a Coast Guard Headquarters e-mail dated September 29, 2006, “The NRC does not 
differentiate between those suspicious activities calls/reports that originate from the AWW program and 
those originating from the requirements on MTSA regulated vessels and facilities to report suspicious 
activity.” 
185 RCMP Marine Service’s Fact Sheets, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/factsheets/fact_marine_e.htm. 
186 RCMP’s National Ports Strategy, http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/factsheets/pdfs/national_ports_e.pdf 
(accessed March 19, 2007). 
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resources necessary to detect, assess and respond to a marine security threat.”187 Coast 
Watch is explicitly part of this national, integrated effort. 
The Coastal Watch program, like its American Counterpart AWW, attempts to 
gather information on all maritime-related illegal activities with an emphasis on 
terrorism. But the primary difference between the programs is the long term partnering, 
interface and legacy training opportunities afforded participants in Coastal Watch by the 
RCMP’s Auxiliary Police Constables whereas the U.S. program, AWW, relies on 
pamphlets and stickers to simply promulgate the existence and reasons of utilizing a 
national call-in center.   
3.  Auxiliaries as a Citizen Interface – Different Programmatic 
Approaches, Differing Results 
Our role is to determine what is out there so as to provide adequate 
warning to government and, where appropriate, to law enforcement 
agencies about threats to the security of Canada, in particular from 
terrorism. If we lose our ability to do so, then Canadians and our allies will 
have been ill served.188  -- Ward Elcock, CSIS Director 
While both countries have professional Auxiliaries, the United States Coast Guard 
Auxiliary is expressly forbidden to participate in a law enforcement or intelligence 
gathering capacity.  This is not the case in Canada where an Auxiliarist is an extension of 
the RCMP, Auxiliary members currently do not routinely carry side arms but are trained 
in their use and can carry a shotgun when in the presence of a regular RCMP officer. 
Auxiliary Constables carry expandable batons, Pepper Spray, Handcuffs and in some 
cases have the power to arrest.189 In support of the maritime realm RCMP Auxiliary 
members routinely administer on-site MDA training to homeowners and businesses alike 
and then keep these contacts on a “beat” system with periodic face to face follow ups. 
                                                 
187 Securing an Open Society One Year Later, Progress Report on the Implementation of Canada’s 
National Security Policy, http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/ministers/deputypm/secure_e.pdf (accessed 
March 18, 2007). 
188 Remarks by Ward Elcock, CSIS Director, to the National Joint Committee of Senior Criminal 
Justice Officials, November 22, 2001. 
189 Found under s.8 of the Auxiliary Constable, Wikipedia  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auxiliary_Constable, (accessed March 18, 2007). 
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The proximity of RCMP and regional police also add greater emphasis on intelligence 
collection via traditional community policing methods. Additionally, the RCMP sponsors 
annual 3-day training seminars for its Auxiliary who in turn disseminates follow on 
training to key citizens and stakeholders alike. Coastal Watch has also recently adopted a 
“hot contact” and information distribution system that regularly and automatically 
informs its “security network” of on-the-water concerns, issues or threats thus increasing 
the RCMP’s maritime reach.190 
The United States Coast Guard Auxiliary also participates in outreach by 
promoting waterway awareness. Its written goal is to attempt to enlist a great majority of 
70 million recreational boaters to participate as Coast Guard eyes and ears.191 Their 
method of “enlisting” help is simply “getting the word out to boaters” via pamphlets and 
stickers. There is no formal approach to collecting legacy contacts, maintaining routine 
training or consistently informing stakeholders. Since 1939 the Coast Guard Auxiliary’s 
primary mission has traditionally been boating safety and they are expressly forbidden to 
participate in law enforcement activities. As such, their ability to collect LE information, 
distribute sensitive-but-important security news and adequately train potential maritime 
stakeholders is limited indeed.   
Coastal Watch and the Canadian Government have invested much in their 
maritime citizen network thus capturing and putting into practice a philosophy that, 
ironically, American Thomas Jefferson spoke of nearly 200 years ago. He wrote, “I know 
of no safe depository of the ultimate power of the society but the people themselves...”192 
While the AWW program has not garnered evidence of a single successful case, 
Jefferson’s concept can be seen in the following northwest regional Coastal Watch 
accomplishments:   
                                                 
190 Methods taken from the Coast Guard’s regional (not national) Citizen’s Action Network. 
191 United States Coast Guard Auxiliary Marine Domain Awareness, 
http://www.americaswaterwaywatch.org/PDF/MDAwhitepaperv2.0-Feb.%202005.pdf (accessed March 18, 
2007), 14. 
192 Thomas Jefferson on Politics & Government, Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis, 1820. ME 
15:278, http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff0350.htm (accessed September 27, 2006). 
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• A participant observed small vessel approach their shore from 
nearby island at night and without lights. After reporting the 
situation via the regional proscribed method, an investigation was 
launched on nearby island which revealed a methamphetamine lab 
in a pre-production phase. 
• A suspect vessel was evading detection near the international 
border. RCMP called upon their Coastal Watchers and the suspect 
vessel was twice located and reported in transit. Information was 
relayed to the USCG who affected a successful apprehension. 
• A Canadian citizen observed and reported a decrepit vessel which 
matched Coastal Watch profiles.  The RCMP responded to this 
report and apprehended 159 migrants on board. 
4.  Building an Integrated Security System, Gathering the Bigger Picture 
According to Canadian Government literature, key post 9/11 changes were made 
in the makeup of its intelligence services for key security instruments to work as fully 
integrated. For instance, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness now 
includes key departments and agencies under one ministerial roof. These ministers 
include CSIS and the RCMP, Emergency Management, the Canada Border Services 
Agency and others. Additionally, the National Security Advisor briefs the Prime Minister 
on national security from an integrated government-wide perspective.193  While parallel 
changes were made in the Department of Homeland Security, much can be said about the 
unity of effort and unity of domain offered by keeping the Canadian grass-roots 
intelligence efforts within a single Canadian entity – the RCMP. In contrast, nearly all of 
the Coast Guard’s authorities (with the exception of a very rare “hot pursuit”) end at the 
waterline. Thus the RCMP’s Coastal Watch enjoys consistency between its terrestrial and 
maritime missions while the Coast Guard’s AWW straddles two intelligence domains 
(garnering intelligence from land-based citizens to support a marine domain challenge) 
and the accompanying ingrained barriers which include myriad agencies at the state and 
local level and the FBI at the national level. The CG/FBI relationship, for instance, has 
                                                 
193 “Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy,” http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&page=publications&sub=natsecurnat&doc=natsecurnat_e.htm#ch2 
(accessed March 18, 2007).  
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been greatly challenged in its cooperative approach in recent years – enough to draw 
public criticism and potentially degrade maritime security.194 
5.  Where Do We Go From Here? 
Even before 9/11 there existed both a terror threat from Canada and a maritime 
nexus. Consider on December 14, 1999, Montreal resident Ahmed Ressam was arrested 
in Port Angeles, Washington, while attempting to cross into the U.S .carrying bomb-
making material he had assembled in Canada. He claimed that the intended target was 
Los Angeles airport. In the eight years since Ressam’s capture, there have been vast 
shakeups in the professional LE organizations on both sides of the border.  
Since 9/11 national strategy documents in the U.S. have gone to great lengths to 
promote unity of effort in the collection and distribution of field intelligence. While great 
and lasting changes have been implemented at the federal level amongst nearly every LE 
agency similar efforts to collectively harness grass-roots, citizen-based intelligence have 
met with legal and moral challenges. Specifically, the attempt to formalize this process 
via Operation TIPS in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks was effectively killed leaving 
federal agencies scrambling to organize less conspicuous programs that now operate 
within sequestered domains or realms. Ultimately, as top-tier agencies and programs are 
experiencing the value of collective efforts, citizen-based information harnessing 
programs have been left behind and now operate in an uncoordinated fashion -- 
potentially damaging national security. 
Leadership in the U.S. could learn much from its northern neighbors to establish a 
centralized, aggressive “hand’s on” approach for its wide range of disparate citizen-based 
security reporting programs. While Coast Guard Auxiliary members are dedicated, their 
boating safety roles don’t adequately prepare them to carry out the training required for a 
land based, intelligence-driven mission. If the AWW program was established using the 
best practices from Coast Watch, it could better fit well into the conceptual arguments 
forwarded in the National Strategy for Homeland Security which suggests Americans 
                                                 
194 “FBI, Coast Guard in Squabble, Investigator: Disagreements Threaten Maritime Security,” 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/03/terror/main1467671.shtml (accessed February 14, 2007). See 
also, Office of the Inspector General Audit Report, 06-26 March 2006. 
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consider volunteering to support police, join neighborhood watch groups or receive 
Community Emergency Response Team training among others. Providing a one-stop 
shopping for training, distribution and support would greatly help our nation’s multi-




6.  Summary of comparative aspects of the Canadian and U.S. models of 















































Coast Guard  
 
 
While the RCMP works intelligence gathering directly with 
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service covering both 
terrestrial and seaborne aspects, the Coast Guard is 
responsible to work with a broader set of agencies within 
DHS or tangentially with the FBI or DOD to capture or 
receive intelligence about terrestrial issues.  
 
Little potential for strategic improvement here as the U.S. 
Intelligence community just completed a major overhaul.  
Tactical improvements in the U.S. along these lines will 
happen piecemeal at the emerging Joint Harbor Operations 
Centers – essentially fusion centers at major ports.  Not all 





















Limits the U.S. Coast Guard’s intelligence led programs to 
U.S. ships and other ships in U.S. waters.  Authorities include 
activities in ports and some oversight with activities at some 
mandated U.S. port facilities.  RCMP enjoys a “fluid” sea-to-
shore seamless program advantage. 
 
Little potential for strategic improvement here as the U.S. 
legal authorities would have to dramatically shift in line with 
the RCMP model.  Until then, the best chance for success lies 
in close CG partnering with state and local police who have a 
maritime role.  With 1,000’s of these agencies nationally, 
tendering a formal approach capturing full cooperation will 
be difficult.  In major port cities joint participation by 






















Auxiliary enforcement stance with the RCMP.  RCMP AC’s have some 
LE capacity while the Coast Guard Auxiliary, organized and 
trained primarily as a search and rescue force multiplier, does 
not easily fit into the “role” of leading intelligence-led 
policing effort. 
 
Of all the program opportunities this might have the most 
impact on improvement on the U.S. side. USCG Auxiliary 
members could be utilized in a more LE specific role if they 
were trained by regional land-based intelligence gathering or 
police services along the lines of the RCMP AC training 
program. However simple on paper, this programmatic leap 
would face stiff resistance from Auxiliary and USCG 
program managers as any suggestion of Auxiliary 
participation in LE activities has been ardently avoided since 
the Auxiliary program’s inception in 1939. Another option 
would be to correlate the USCG citizen based intelligence 
collection needs to more of a state sponsored program (like is 
being run by the New Jersey State Police). A state/federal 
collective approach to an all-domain systematic approach for 
grass roots intelligence collection could realistically become 












and carry out 
routine 






















Obvious differences include the invested responsibilities of 
RCMP ACs to tend to a citizen-based population offering a 
consistent interface to support the larger program.  The 
RCMP offers annual 3 day training sessions.  The U.S. 
Auxiliary, in contrast, routinely promotes the use of the toll 
free reporting number as its primary mode of engagement.  
There have been inconsistent attempts at regional “training” 
intended to indoctrinate Auxiliary members on the threats to 
our national waterways in the post 9/11 environment.  The 
training here differs as the RCMP AC’s training includes 
local RCMP policing trends specific to the AOR represented.  
The U.S. version offers a “canned” national approach with 
little emphasis on police-led intelligence tailored to the 
region. 
 
The training differences, like the law enforcement oversight, 
offers the U.S. program tremendous opportunity for 
improvement by simply reaching out to specific citizens in 
strategic areas instead of the current shotgun effort employed 
now and by offering a regional POC for those selected to be 






















The RCMP call centers also act as the point of contact for 
Airport-related citizen reports essentially spanning terrestrial 
and maritime issues.  The Coast Guard call center carries no 
terrestrial-based call in responsibilities. Other call centers 
collecting citizen reports exist, such as Highway Watch, but 
they aren’t connected to the CG’s and there remains no 




The regional differences in hosting many call centers vice one 
might support an emphasis of RCMP to tailor its regional 
approaches to grass-roots education and intelligence 
collection.  Notably, the Canadian model might benefit from 
an information collection/distribution “economy of scale” in 
that it endeavors to collect both maritime and terrestrial 
reports – essentially aligning the model with the RCMP’s 
dual LE role. The U.S. call center might indeed benefit by 
merging watch center.  For instance, the U.S. trucking watch 
program, Highway Watch, has 1000’s of trucks onboard port 
facilities across the country.  However, Highway Watch does 
not cross train their “watchers” on port specific issues and 
they don’t formerly share info or call the CG’s watch center.  
This is also true for the reverse; the CG center does not have a 
protocol to inform or work with the Highway Watch national 
reporting center despite their common mission and incredibly 




He knows that his task as the Director of National Intelligence is to make 
certain that America stays ahead of this enemy and learns their intentions 
before they strike. He knows that we must stop them from harming our 
citizens; that the most important task of this government of ours is to 
protect the American people. 
President George W. Bush 
At the Swearing-In of Mike McConnell  
Director of National Intelligence 
February 20, 2007 
 
7.  Recommendations 
Since 9/11 national strategy documents have gone to great lengths to promote 
unity of effort in the collection and distribution of field intelligence.  While great and 
lasting changes have been implemented at the federal level amongst nearly every LE 
agency similar efforts to collectively harness grass-roots, citizen-based intelligence has 
met with legal and moral challenges. Specifically, an attempt to formalize this process in 
the weeks following the 9/11 attacks was effectively killed leaving federal agencies 
scrambling to organize less conspicuous programs that operate within sequestered 
domains or realms.  Ultimately as top-tier agencies and programs are experiencing the 
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value of collective efforts, citizen-based information harnessing programs have been left 
behind and now operate in an uncoordinated fashion which is potentially damaging to 
national security. 
This paper compares two federally based collection programs, discusses the 
ramifications of their operations and suggests steps toward improvements in line with 
concepts forwarded in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. 
a.  Centralization of a Multi-Jurisdictional Approach to Private 
Citizen Information Gathering 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002195 reshaped the role and powers of 
many traditional and emergent law enforcement disciplines. Broad changes to federal law 
enforcement elements, such as the re-shuffling of national intelligence community, are 
among the most obvious. These efforts conceptually streamlined the way anti-terror 
information is shared, managed and analyzed to best fight the nation’s Global War on 
Terror (GWOT). These changes, among others, signaled a sea change in post-9/11 
intelligence vetting towards a more “collective” or shared philosophy as evidenced, for 
instance, by the funding and staffing of state fusion centers196 or the establishment of the 
National Counterterrorism Center. 
While the centralization of a multi-jurisdictional approach to collective 
information is noteworthy and seemingly effective (as we haven’t had a major domestic 
terror attack since 9/11) lesser known grass-roots-based entities, supporting citizen-based 
information collection efforts such as Highway Watch,197 or USA on Watch,198 receive 
federal funding but remain fragmented, non-centralized and non-standardized. The 
random status of these well-intentioned yet disparate domestic-based intelligence 
gathering groups promises tremendous upside; yet there’s been little effort beyond some 
                                                 
195 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf (accessed March 6, 2007). 
196 Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines, 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_executive_summary.pdf (accessed March 6, 2007). 
197 Highway Watch, http://www.highwaywatch.com/, (accessed March 6, 2007). 
198 USA on Watch, http://www.usaonwatch.org/AboutUs/AboutUSAOnWatch.htm (accessed 
September 13, 2006). 
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regional cross referencing successes, to formalize, recognize and implement a national, 
multi-disciplinary strategy to capitalize on not only the intelligence potential, but the 
educational and enlightenment opportunities afforded citizens who take part in such 
networking endeavors.  
This paper proposes that, through a brief comparative and data analysis, 
that these programs should be collectively managed and uniformly directed for maximum 
efficiencies and broad potential to supporting all post 9/11 intelligence and police 
agencies at every level.   
b.  History 
While it’s been obvious to national HS leadership that law enforcement 
and the judiciary are vital in the terror/criminal investigative or preemptive functions, 
securing the homeland within the bounds of constitutionally protected individual rights 
has been a visceral topic spurring contentious debate beginning within days following the 
9/11 attacks. A key element appearing as part of the groundbreaking Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, for instance, was dropped from further development as it was too 
controversial amongst some politicians and civil rights activists. Operation TIPS, a 
citizen information collection plan designed and proposed by the Justice Department, was 
killed by then House majority leader Dick Armey and others such as the ACLU199 vowed 
not to let “Americans to spy on one another.”200  The follow up to the concerns was the 
repeal of Operation TIPS within the Act’s own section 880 which states that, “any and all 
activities of the Federal Government to implement the proposed component program of 
the Citizen Corps known as Operation TIPS (Terrorism Information and Prevention 
System) are hereby prohibited.”201   
Operation TIPS or any other federal level program supporting citizen’s as 
information or intelligence gatherers never resurfaced. Important to the thesis of this 
                                                 
199 American Civil Liberties Union, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17109prs20021114.html  
(accessed  September 13, 2007. 
200 Nat Hentoff, “The Death of Operation TIPS Volunteer Spying Corps Dismissed,” 
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0251,hentoff,40587,6.html (accessed September 13, 2006). 
201 The Homeland Security Act 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf (accessed March 6, 2007). 
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paper is the concept that section 880 seemingly delivered a death blow to the concept of a 
larger, formal, federal-level leadership to citizen-based LE information collection. Since 
the death of Operation TIPS the concept has been a strategic no show in every major post 
9/11 national strategy document.  
In the meantime, lesser profile citizen-to-government intelligence 
collection and reporting processes have been launched by several HS and police agencies 
to fill the void left by Operation TIPS -- built on laws (such as the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994)202 that were already on the books. Now a handful of 
closely related programs fill the mission void and service a variety of disciplines and 
agencies.  
I will attempt to demonstrate in the following paragraphs that these 
“individual” programs are at risk of ultimately becoming stuck within operational or 
mission “silos”. Without a national standard or guidance to work from, these citizen 
based programs will not be able to reach their full potential as viable options within the 
GWOT tool chest. 
c.  Organizations 
USA on Watch,203 for example, is organized by the non-profit National 
Sheriffs' Association. Its goal is to empower citizens through neighborhood watch 
programs while providing standardized approaches to implementing terrestrial, 
community level programs across the nation. Within months of 9/11, Attorney General 
John Ashcroft announced the expanded mission for the National Sheriff's Association's 
National Neighborhood Watch (NWW) program. Ashcroft pledge $1.9 million in federal 
funds to help the association double the number of participant groups to 15,000 
nationwide204 claiming the program was vital for fighting crime and terrorism. By 
default, it seems USA on Watch has become the surrogate or the Department of Justice’s 
                                                 
202 Library of Congress, http://thomas.loc.gov, (accessed September 13, 2006).  
203 USA on Watch, http://www.usaonwatch.org/AboutUs/AboutUSAOnWatch.htm (accessed 
September 13, 2006). 
204 “Attorney General Ashcroft Announces Neighborhood Watch Campaign,” 
http://www.usafreedomcorps.gov/about_usafc/newsroom/announcements_dynamic.asp?ID=113 (accessed 
September 13, 2006). 
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fallback to the failed implementation of Operation TIPS; ostensibly taking the form of a 
politically acceptable non-profit organization. This conceptual leap – from a 
neighborhood crime reporting program to one with a formal federalized mission – can be 
detected in this DOJ quote pulled from USA on Watch’s website: 
National Neighborhood Watch is a simple program of neighbors looking 
after neighbors, and in doing so, you are looking out for your nation. More 
than 30 years later, National Neighborhood Watch has re-invented itself in 
a time when we needed it more than ever, and today, it remains our 
nation's flagship citizen-partnership program.205  
While the DOJ would seemingly have USA on Watch ramp up to a pan-
organizational/pan-national program, the USA on Watch program itself does not identify 
counter terrorism information collection as a component of its service nor does it take 
into account multi-disciplinary homeland security concerns (i.e. threats in the maritime, 
highway or air domain for instance).  In short, despite DOJ’s insistence at calling USA on 
Watch the nation’s “flagship” citizen-partnering program, it comes up woefully short on 
mission diversity or depth -- concentrating instead on championing neighborhood crime 
reporting as its modus operandi.   
Another significant attempt at utilizing citizen-based reporting outside of 
an “all hazards” federal approach is through the Highway Watch program. Highway 
Watch is administered by the American Trucking Associations under a cooperative 
agreement with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  The program’s mission is to 
assist in ensuring the safety and security of the nation by providing a team of trained 
truck drivers (or other related industry individuals) who collectively observe, assess, 
report, analyze and respond to items or incidents which might pose a threat. The “nerve 
center” of this program is the Highway Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(HISAC).  
As the information receiving point of more than 300,000 trained and 
uniquely identified participants, the HISAC serves as an analytical and communications 
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focal point for the federally funded program. However, when questioned on the 
program’s multi agency network capabilities, the answers tended toward work in 
progress.  Consider this query to the Coast Guard’s National Response Center (NRC -- 
only a few miles away from the Highway Watches “Sharing” and Analysis Center) watch 
supervisor about their relationship with HW. 
The NRC currently doesn’t have an existing relationship with the 
Highway Watch program. In the past some of our watchstanders have 
gone on to receive training from the Highway Watch program, but we 
don’t have an existing MOA or MOU with them that I’m aware of. This is 
something that we will take a serious look at as it appears to be a viable 
watch similar in scope to AWW.206  
This relationship (or lack thereof) is highly important when one considers 
the tens of thousands of trucks which everyday service this nation’s 361 ports, ships and 
containers.  Every truck that finds its way aboard a USCG regulated port facility when 
moving port cargo falls into each part of the NRC and HISAC mission – but the programs 
aren’t working together! Certainly, a formal relationship between DHS’s Highway Watch 
and DHS’s USCG NRC could provide intelligence-based, cross-referenced, anti-terror 
synergies well above and beyond what is currently taking place. The current state of these 
programs, I suggest, reflects a similar state of affairs among our pre-9/11 federal LE 
agencies. The following excerpt was taken from the 9/11 Commission Report: 
Earlier in this report we detailed various missed opportunities to thwart the 
9/11 plot. Information was not shared, sometimes inadvertently or because 
of legal misunderstandings. Analysis was not pooled. Effective operations 
were not launched. Often the handoffs of information were lost across the 
divide separating the foreign and domestic agencies of the government. 
However the specific problems are labeled, we believe they are symptoms 
of the government’s broader inability to adapt how it manages problems to 
the new challenges of the twenty-first century. The agencies are like a set 
of specialists in a hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms, and 
 
205 Message from the Department of Justice to USA on Watch members as displayed on USAOW’s 
website,   http://www.usaonwatch.org/Messages/AMessageFromTheDepartmentOfJustice.php (accessed 
March 6, 2007). 
206 AWW is America’s Waterway Watch.  Yet another federally funded program with limited ties to 
other programs.  Text was taken from Email received by author dated September, 19, 2006. 
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prescribing medications. What is missing is the attending physician who 
makes sure they work as a team. 
While USA on Watch and Highway Watch represent only two of dozens 
of terrestrial-based “engagement” programs, they are limited in their scope, capabilities, 
training, technical support and information distribution. 
d.  Where Do We Go From Here? 
Much like the post 9/11 shakeups in the professional LE organizations, a 
similar effort needs to be taken to establish a centralized and layered approach to grass 
roots security reporting programs. Once established, it would fit well into the arguments 
forwarded in the National Strategy for Homeland Security which defines homeland 
security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 
States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 
recover from attacks that do occur.” To carry out these goals the administration relies on 
“…principles of shared responsibility and partnership with the Congress, state and local 
governments, the private sector and the American people”.207 (my emphasis) 
My recommendation is that the Department of Justice takes the lead to 
establish guidelines, training and logistics support in servicing a national citizen based 
reporting mechanism.  It could create a single web portal that services all states and all 
agencies (federal, state and local) as a clearing house for subordinate programs to work 
from. Calls or reports of intelligence information should be taken from one central source 
and vetted appropriately (this is the strategy the NRC uses with its 1-888-24-watch phone 
number) to fusion centers or other HS entity with appropriate jurisdiction.  
8.  Conclusion 
The National Strategy suggests Americans consider volunteering to support 
police, join neighborhood watch groups or receive Community Emergency Response 
Team training among others. While this call to service exists and has been headed by 
1,000’s, there remains no formal, cross-disciplined federal effort to capture and 
                                                 
207 The National Strategy for Maritime Security. Washington D.C: Office of Homeland Security, 
September 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html (accessed August14, 2006), 
2. 
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adequately distribute collected information. Providing a one-stop shopping for training, 
distribution and support would greatly help our nation’s multi-disciplined, multi-
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